display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
2 ideas
9294 | No individuating marks distinguish between Souls [Teichmann] |
Full Idea: There are no individuating marks which could serve to differentiate one Soul from another. | |
From: Jenny Teichmann (The Mind and the Soul [1974], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: Presumably they could have at least much identity as two different electrons (if they are in space-time?). It is hard to see why anyone would be interested in their 'own' immortality, if loss of all individuality was a condition. |
9292 | The Soul has no particular capacity (in the way thinking belongs to the mind) [Teichmann] |
Full Idea: On the whole, the Soul has no capacities which belong to it pre-eminently in the way that thinking 'belongs' to the mind. | |
From: Jenny Teichmann (The Mind and the Soul [1974], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: There are no phenomena which have to be saved by postulating a soul. It lacks a function within a human being, but it has a crucial function within a large theological picture. |