display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
2 ideas
6276 | 'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green [Putnam] |
Full Idea: 'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Three) | |
A reaction: The word 'warranted' seems to be ambiguous in modern philosophy. See Idea 6150. There seem to be internalist and externalist versions. It seems clear to say that a belief could be well-justified and yet false. |
4714 | Putnam's epistemic notion of truth replaces the realism of correspondence with ontological relativism [Putnam, by O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Putnam replaces a correspondence theory of truth with an epistemic notion of truth - truth is idealized rational acceptability. The correspondence theory is committed to realism, but his allows ontological relativism. | |
From: report of Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History [1981]) by Paul O'Grady - Relativism Ch.3 | |
A reaction: This seems to be part of a slide by Putnam away from realism towards pragmatism. As a robust and defiant realist, this always strikes me as the road to hell. |