display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
3 ideas
18351 | Propositions are made true, in virtue of something which explains its truth [Lowe] |
Full Idea: If a proposition is 'made' true, it has to be true 'in virtue of' something, meaning a relationship of metaphysical explanation. Thus a true proposition must have truth conferred on it in some way that explains how it gets to be true. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (An essentialist approach to Truth-making [2009], p.202) | |
A reaction: It is good to ask what we mean by 'makes'. I like essentialist explanations, but this may be misplaced. Observing that y makes x true seems to be rather less than actually explaining how it does it. What would such explanations look like? |
8315 | Maybe facts are just true propositions [Lowe] |
Full Idea: If facts are 'proposition-like' or 'thinkable' (we speak of 'knowing' or 'understanding' facts) might they not simply be true propositions? | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11.2) | |
A reaction: They certainly can't be if we are going to use facts as what makes propositions true. The proposal would be empty without out some other account of truth (probably a dubious one). Facts are truth-makers? |
8319 | One-to-one correspondence would need countable, individuable items [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Where there is one-to-one correspondence there must certainly be countable, and therefore individuable items of some kind. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11.6) | |
A reaction: Lowe is criticising precise notions of 'a fact'. We can respond by relaxing the notion of 'one-to-one', if critics are going to be fussy about exactly what the items are. "There is a huge wave coming" doesn't need a precise notion of a wave to be true. |