Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Anaxarchus, William of Ockham and JP Burgess / G Rosen

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3 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
A proposition is true if its subject and predicate stand for the same thing [William of Ockham]
     Full Idea: If in the proposition 'This is an angel' subject and predicate stand for the same thing, the proposition is true.
     From: William of Ockham (Summa totius logicae [1323], II.c.ii)
     A reaction: An interesting statement of what looks like a correspondence theory, employing the idea that both the subject and the predicate have a reference. I think Frege would say that 'x is an angel' is unsaturated, and so lacks reference.
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
Ockham had an early axiomatic account of truth [William of Ockham, by Halbach]
     Full Idea: Theories structurally very similar to axiomatic compositional theories of truth can be found in Ockham's 'Summa Logicae'.
     From: report of William of Ockham (Summa totius logicae [1323]) by Volker Halbach - Axiomatic Theories of Truth 3
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
'True' is only occasionally useful, as in 'everything Fermat believed was true' [Burgess/Rosen]
     Full Idea: In the disquotational view of truth, what saves truth from being wholly redundant and so wholly useless, is mainly that it provides an ability to state generalisations like 'Everything Fermat believed was true'.
     From: JP Burgess / G Rosen (A Subject with No Object [1997], I.A.2.c)
     A reaction: Sounds like the thin end of the wedge. Presumably we can infer that the first thing Fermat believed on his last Christmas Day was true.