display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
8 ideas
| 12910 | The predicate is in the subject of a true proposition [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: In a true proposition the concept of the predicate is always present in the subject. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.07.4/14 X) | |
| A reaction: This sounds very like the Kantian notion of an analytic truth, but Leibniz is applying it to all truths. So Socrates must contain the predicate of running as part of his nature (or essence?), if 'Socrates runs' is to be true. |
| 19333 | A truth is just a proposition in which the predicate is contained within the subject [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: In every true affirmative proposition, necessary or contingent, universal or particular, the concept of the predicate is in a sense included in that of the subject; the predicate is present in the subject; or else I do not know what truth is. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.07.4/14) | |
| A reaction: Why did he qualify this with "in a sense"? This is referred to as the 'concept containment theory of truth'. This is an odd view of the subject. If the truth is 'Peter fell down stairs', we don't usually think the concept of Peter contains such things. |
| 3883 | A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition: no truth is contradicted by another. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 9.1) | |
| A reaction: Interesting. It resembles the rule that if you always tell the truth you don't need to remember what you said. Close to the heart of the concept of truth. Coherence and correspondence. |
| 18542 | Defining truth presupposes that there can be a true definition [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: How can you define truth, without already assuming the distinction between a true definition and a false one? | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 1) | |
| A reaction: Don't say we have to accept truth as yet another primitive! Philosophers are out of business if all the basic concepts are primitive. The axiomatic approach to truth is an alternative - by specifying how the primitive should be used. |
| 19389 | Truth is a characteristic of possible thoughts [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Truth really belongs to the class of thoughts which are possible. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Dialogue on Things and Words [1677], p.7) | |
| A reaction: I like the fact that this ties truth to 'thoughts', rather than peculiar abstract unthought entities called 'propositions', but I take it that thoughts which are possible but not thought will thereby not exist, so they can't be true. |
| 19388 | True and false seem to pertain to thoughts, yet unthought propositions seem to be true or false [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: B: I concede that truth and falsity both pertain to thoughts and not to things. A: But this contradicts your previous opinion that a proposition remains true even when you are not thinking about it. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Dialogue on Things and Words [1677], p.7) | |
| A reaction: I don't trigger the truth of a proposition by thinking about it - I see that it is true. But I dislike the idea that reality is full of propositions, which seems to be mad metaphysics. So I deny unthought propositions are true, because there aren't any. |
| 5022 | We hold a proposition true if we are ready to follow it, and can't see any objections [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: A proposition is held to be true by us when our mind is ready to follow it and no reason for doubting it can be found. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Introduction to a Secret Encyclopaedia [1679], p.7) | |
| A reaction: This follows on from Descartes' view, but it now sounds more like psychology than metaphysics. Clearly a false proposition could fit this desciption. Personally I follow propositions to which I can see no objection, without actually holding them true. |
| 13157 | Choose the true hypothesis, which is the most intelligible one [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: One should choose the more intelligible hypothesis, and the truth is nothing but its intelligibility. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Copernicanism and Relativity of Motion [1689], p.91) | |
| A reaction: This apparently simple observation strikes me as being rather profound. Our picture of the world is shaped entirely by what is intelligible to us. An odd notion of truth, though. The age of reason. See Idea 13158. |