display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
6 ideas
19466 | The word 'true' seems to be unique and indefinable [Frege] |
Full Idea: It seems likely that the content of the word 'true' is sui generis and indefinable | |
From: Gottlob Frege (The Thought: a Logical Enquiry [1918], p.327 (60)) | |
A reaction: This is the view I associate with Davidson, though fans of Axiomatic Truth give up defining it, and just describe how it behaves. Defining it is very elusive, but I don't accept that nothing can be said about the contents of the concept of truth. |
8187 | Frege was strongly in favour of taking truth to attach to propositions [Frege, by Dummett] |
Full Idea: Frege was strongly in favour of taking truth to attach to propositions, which he called 'thoughts' and regarded as being expressed by sentences. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (On Sense and Reference [1892]) by Michael Dummett - Truth and the Past 1 | |
A reaction: Sometimes it is necessary to know the time, the place, and the speaker before one can evaluate the truth of a proposition. Not just indexical words, but the indexical aspect of, say, "the team played badly". |
22317 | Truth does not admit of more and less [Frege] |
Full Idea: What is only half true is untrue. Truth does not admit of more and less. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (works [1890], CP 353), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 48 'Truth' | |
A reaction: What about a measurement which is accurate to three decimal places? Maybe being 'close to' the truth is not the same as being 'more' true. The truth about a distance between two points is unknowable? |
13881 | We need to grasp not number-objects, but the states of affairs which make number statements true [Frege, by Wright,C] |
Full Idea: For Frege (as opposed to Gödel) the epistemological aim is not to relate to the objects which are the subject-matter of number theory, but to relate to the states of affairs that make for the truth of number-theoretic statements. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]) by Crispin Wright - Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects 1.v | |
A reaction: I am beginning to see that this is a key issue in modern philosophy, of whether we build our metaphysics on the things of the world or on the truths about the world. I vote for the things, because the other way slides into anti-realism. |
19465 | There cannot be complete correspondence, because ideas and reality are quite different [Frege] |
Full Idea: It is essential that the reality shall be distinct from the idea. But then there can be no complete correspondence, no complete truth. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (The Thought: a Logical Enquiry [1918], p.327 (60)) | |
A reaction: He thinks that logic can give a perfect account of truth, or at least the extension of truth, where ordinary language will always fail. I wonder what he would have thought of Tarski's theory? |
19468 | The property of truth in 'It is true that I smell violets' adds nothing to 'I smell violets' [Frege] |
Full Idea: The sentence 'I smell the scent of violets' has just the same content as 'It is true that I smell the scent of violets'. So it seems that nothing is added to the thought by my ascribing to it the property of truth. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (The Thought: a Logical Enquiry [1918], p.328 (61)) | |
A reaction: This idea predates Ramsey's similar proposal, for which, oddly, Ramsey always seems to get the credit. To a logician they may have identical content, but pragmatically they are likely to differ in context. 'True' certainly doesn't add to the thought. |