Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Donald Davidson, Erik J. Olsson and A.J. Ayer

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4 ideas

3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson]
     Full Idea: Truth is one of the clearest and most basic concepts we have, so it is fruitless to dream of eliminating it in favor of something simpler or more fundamental.
     From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 3)
     A reaction: For redundancy theorists, I suppose, truth would be eliminated in favour of 'assertion'. Replacing it with 'satisfaction' doesn't seem very illuminating. Davidson would say 'reference' is more tricky and elusive than truth.
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
We cannot analyse the concept of 'truth', because it is simply a mark that a sentence is asserted [Ayer]
     Full Idea: When one says that "Queen Anne is dead" is true or false, these terms 'true' and 'false' connote nothing, but function in the sentence simply as marks of assertion and denial, so there is no sense in asking us to analyse the concept of 'truth'.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.5)
     A reaction: "I am ill" may be true when you say it, and false when I say it. The word 'true' has a useful function in 'x is true if y'. "If that is true, Freddie, I will hit you".
Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language [Davidson]
     Full Idea: Disquotation cannot pretend to give a complete account of the concept of truth, since it works only in the special case where the metalanguage contains the object language. Neither can contain their own truth predicate.
     From: Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], p.10)
     A reaction: Presumably more sophisticated and complete accounts would need a further account of translation between languages - which explains Quine's interest in that topic. […see this essay, p.12]
Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson]
     Full Idea: It is clearly a mistake to call Tarski a disquotationalist. ...We say of a sentence not at hand (such as 'You gave the right answer to this question last night, but I can't remember what you said') that it is true or false.
     From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 7)