Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Hermarchus, Kurt Gdel and Paul Boghossian

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these philosophers

display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers


2 ideas

3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
Prior to Gödel we thought truth in mathematics consisted in provability [Gödel, by Quine]
     Full Idea: Gödel's proof wrought an abrupt turn in the philosophy of mathematics. We had supposed that truth, in mathematics, consisted in provability.
     From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Willard Quine - Forward to Gödel's Unpublished
     A reaction: This explains the crisis in the early 1930s, which Tarski's theory appeared to solve.
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
Minimalism is incoherent, as it implies that truth both is and is not a property [Boghossian, by Horwich]
     Full Idea: Boghossian argues that minimalism is incoherent because it says truth both is and is not a property; the essence of minimalism is that, unlike traditional theories, truth is not a property, yet properties are needed to explain the theory.
     From: report of Paul Boghossian (The Status of Content [1990]) by Paul Horwich - Truth (2nd edn) Post.8
     A reaction: I doubt whether this is really going to work as a demolition, because it seems to me that no philosophers are even remotely clear about what a property is. If properties are defined causally, it is not quite clear how truth would ever be a property.