display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
2 ideas
| 8315 | Maybe facts are just true propositions [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: If facts are 'proposition-like' or 'thinkable' (we speak of 'knowing' or 'understanding' facts) might they not simply be true propositions? | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11.2) | |
| A reaction: They certainly can't be if we are going to use facts as what makes propositions true. The proposal would be empty without out some other account of truth (probably a dubious one). Facts are truth-makers? |
| 8319 | One-to-one correspondence would need countable, individuable items [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Where there is one-to-one correspondence there must certainly be countable, and therefore individuable items of some kind. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11.6) | |
| A reaction: Lowe is criticising precise notions of 'a fact'. We can respond by relaxing the notion of 'one-to-one', if critics are going to be fussy about exactly what the items are. "There is a huge wave coming" doesn't need a precise notion of a wave to be true. |