display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
3 ideas
22664 | I do not care if my trivial beliefs are false, and I have no interest in many truths [Nozick] |
Full Idea: I find that I do not mind at all the thought that I have some false beliefs (of US state capitals), and there are many truths I do not care to know at all (total grains of sand on the beach). | |
From: Robert Nozick (The Nature of Rationality [1993], p.67) | |
A reaction: A useful corrective to anyone who blindly asserts that truth is the supreme human value. I would still be annoyed if someone taught me lies about these two types of truth. |
5539 | We must presuppose that truth is agreement of cognition with its objects [Kant] |
Full Idea: The nominal definition of truth, namely that it is agreement of cognition with its objects, is here granted and presupposed; but one demands to know what is the general and certain criterion of the truth of any cognition. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B082/A58) | |
A reaction: I am puzzled by the second part of this, as the demand for a criterion (or justification) seems to me to have no part at all in our notion of what truth is in itself. It is a puzzle that Kant seems to accept the concept of truth used by simple realists. |
22665 | Maybe James was depicting the value of truth, and not its nature [Nozick] |
Full Idea: We might see William James's pragmatic view that truth is what works as depicting the value of truth, and not its nature. | |
From: Robert Nozick (The Nature of Rationality [1993], p.68) | |
A reaction: James didn't think that he was doing this. He firmly says that this IS truth, not just the advantages of truth. Another view is that pragmatists are giving a test for truth. |