Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Jerry A. Fodor, Ernst Zermelo and Jonathan Dancy
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5 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
2435
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Psychology has to include the idea that mental processes are typically truth-preserving [Fodor]
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Full Idea:
A psychology that can't make sense of such facts as that mental processes are typically truth-preserving is ipso facto dead in the water.
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From:
Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §1.3)
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
2768
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The correspondence theory also has the problem that two sets of propositions might fit the facts equally well [Dancy,J]
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Full Idea:
The correspondence theory as well as the coherence theory has the problem of more than one set of truths. Why can't two sets of propositions "fit the facts" equally well?
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From:
Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 8.2)
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3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
2765
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Rescher says that if coherence requires mutual entailment, this leads to massive logical redundancy [Dancy,J]
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Full Idea:
Rescher complains that if coherence requires mutual entailment, then what is entailed is logically redundant, and the whole system is infected with mutual redundancy.
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From:
Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 8.1)
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2769
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If one theory is held to be true, all the other theories appear false, because they can't be added to the true one [Dancy,J]
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Full Idea:
From the point of view of someone with a theory every other theory is false, because it cannot be added to the true theory.
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From:
Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 8.2)
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3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
2766
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Even with a tight account of coherence, there is always the possibility of more than one set of coherent propositions [Dancy,J]
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Full Idea:
No matter how tight our account of coherence we have to admit that there may be more than one set of coherent propositions (as Russell pointed out (1907)).
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From:
Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 8.2)
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