display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
3 ideas
| 19466 | The word 'true' seems to be unique and indefinable [Frege] |
| Full Idea: It seems likely that the content of the word 'true' is sui generis and indefinable | |
| From: Gottlob Frege (The Thought: a Logical Enquiry [1918], p.327 (60)) | |
| A reaction: This is the view I associate with Davidson, though fans of Axiomatic Truth give up defining it, and just describe how it behaves. Defining it is very elusive, but I don't accept that nothing can be said about the contents of the concept of truth. |
| 8187 | Frege was strongly in favour of taking truth to attach to propositions [Frege, by Dummett] |
| Full Idea: Frege was strongly in favour of taking truth to attach to propositions, which he called 'thoughts' and regarded as being expressed by sentences. | |
| From: report of Gottlob Frege (On Sense and Reference [1892]) by Michael Dummett - Truth and the Past 1 | |
| A reaction: Sometimes it is necessary to know the time, the place, and the speaker before one can evaluate the truth of a proposition. Not just indexical words, but the indexical aspect of, say, "the team played badly". |
| 22317 | Truth does not admit of more and less [Frege] |
| Full Idea: What is only half true is untrue. Truth does not admit of more and less. | |
| From: Gottlob Frege (works [1890], CP 353), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 48 'Truth' | |
| A reaction: What about a measurement which is accurate to three decimal places? Maybe being 'close to' the truth is not the same as being 'more' true. The truth about a distance between two points is unknowable? |