Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Novalis, James O. Young and David O. Brink

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5 ideas

3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth

19076	Coherence theories differ over the coherence relation, and over the set of proposition with which to cohere [Young,JO]
	Full Idea: Coherence theories of truth differ on their accounts of the coherence relation, and on their accounts of the set (or sets) of propositions with which true propositions occur (the 'specified set').
	From: James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §1)
	A reaction: Coherence is clearly more than consistency or mutual entailment, and I like to invoke explanation. The set has to be large, or the theory is absurd (as two absurdities can 'cohere'). So very large, or very very large, or maximally large?

19077	Two propositions could be consistent with your set, but inconsistent with one another [Young,JO]
	Full Idea: It is unsatisfactory for the coherence relation to be consistency, because two propositions could be consistent with a 'specified set', and yet be inconsistent with each other. That would imply they are both true, which is impossible.
	From: James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §1)
	A reaction: I'm not convinced by this. You first accept P because it is consistent with the set; then Q turns up, which is consistent with everything in the set except P. So you have to choose between them, and might eject P. Your set was too small.

19078	Coherence with actual beliefs, or our best beliefs, or ultimate ideal beliefs? [Young,JO]
	Full Idea: One extreme for the specified set is the largest consistent set of propositions currently believed by actual people. A moderate position makes it the limit of people's enquiries. The other extreme is what would be believed by an omniscient being.
	From: James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §1)
	A reaction: One not considered is the set of propositions believed by each individual person. Thoroughgoing relativists might well embrace that one. Peirce and Putnam liked the moderate one. I'm taken with the last one, since truth is an ideal, not a phenomenon.

19084	Coherent truth is not with an arbitrary set of beliefs, but with a set which people actually do believe [Young,JO]
	Full Idea: It must be remembered that coherentists do not believe that the truth of a proposition consists in coherence with an arbitrarily chosen set of propositions; the coherence is with a set of beliefs, or a set of propositions held to be true.
	From: James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §3.1)
	A reaction: This is a very good response to critics who cite bizarre sets of beliefs which happen to have internal coherence. You have to ask why they are not actually believed, and the answer must be that the coherence is not extensive enough.

3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique

19083	How do you identify the best coherence set; and aren't there truths which don't cohere? [Young,JO]
	Full Idea: The two main objections to the coherence theory of truth are that there is no way to identify the 'specified set' of propositions without contradiction, ...and that some propositions are true which cohere with no set of beliefs.
	From: James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §3.1/2)
	A reaction: The point of the first is that you need a prior knowledge of truth to say which of two sets is the better one. The second one is thinking of long-lost tiny details from the past, which seem to be true without evidence. A huge set might beat the first one.