Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Adolph Rami, Jody Azzouni and Peter F. Strawson
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20 ideas
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
18335
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There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve [Rami]
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18334
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The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal [Rami]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
18339
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The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
18333
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Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths [Rami]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
18342
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Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths [Rami]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18340
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It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
18341
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Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties [Rami]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
18346
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'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths [Rami]
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18345
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'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths [Rami]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
18343
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Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth [Rami]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
18338
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Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist [Rami]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
12442
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'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' is true without a truthmaker [Azzouni]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
18337
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Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation [Rami]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
10842
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The fact which is stated by a true sentence is not something in the world [Strawson,P]
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10843
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Facts aren't exactly true statements, but they are what those statements say [Strawson,P]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
10844
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The statement that it is raining perfectly fits the fact that it is raining [Strawson,P]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
10841
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The word 'true' always refers to a possible statement [Strawson,P]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
12439
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Truth is dispensable, by replacing truth claims with the sentence itself [Azzouni]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
12437
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Truth lets us assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit [Azzouni]
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18347
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Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property [Rami]
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