Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Alexander, Eucleides and Ross P. Cameron
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18 ideas
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
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18877
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Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things [Cameron]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
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18868
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Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are? [Cameron]
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18928
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If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
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15395
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Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths? [Cameron]
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18931
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Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron]
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18867
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Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth [Cameron]
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18873
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God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists [Cameron]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
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18879
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What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker [Cameron]
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18880
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Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc [Cameron]
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18874
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Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers [Cameron]
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18932
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The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
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15394
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Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths [Cameron]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
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18869
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Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded [Cameron]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
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18923
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The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron]
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18926
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One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron]
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18929
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We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
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18870
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Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable [Cameron]
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18871
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I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers [Cameron]
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