Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Alfred Tarski, Anon (Josh) and Ross P. Cameron

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67 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
16295 Tarski proved that truth cannot be defined from within a given theory [Tarski, by Halbach]
15342 Tarski proved that any reasonably expressive language suffers from the liar paradox [Tarski, by Horsten]
19069 'True sentence' has no use consistent with logic and ordinary language, so definition seems hopeless [Tarski]
10153 In everyday language, truth seems indefinable, inconsistent, and illogical [Tarski]
19178 Definitions of truth should not introduce a new version of the concept, but capture the old one [Tarski]
19177 A definition of truth should be materially adequate and formally correct [Tarski]
19186 A rigorous definition of truth is only possible in an exactly specified language [Tarski]
19194 We may eventually need to split the word 'true' into several less ambiguous terms [Tarski]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
18877 Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
18868 Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are? [Cameron]
18928 If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
18867 Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth [Cameron]
18873 God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists [Cameron]
15395 Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths? [Cameron]
18931 Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18879 What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker [Cameron]
18880 Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc [Cameron]
18874 Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers [Cameron]
18932 The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
15394 Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
18869 Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
18923 The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron]
18926 One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron]
18929 We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
18871 I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers [Cameron]
18870 Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable [Cameron]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
16296 Tarski's Theorem renders any precise version of correspondence impossible [Tarski, by Halbach]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
10672 Tarskian semantics says that a sentence is true iff it is satisfied by every sequence [Tarski, by Hossack]
13338 '"It is snowing" is true if and only if it is snowing' is a partial definition of the concept of truth [Tarski]
19180 It is convenient to attach 'true' to sentences, and hence the language must be specified [Tarski]
19181 In the classical concept of truth, 'snow is white' is true if snow is white [Tarski]
19196 Scheme (T) is not a definition of truth [Tarski]
19183 Each interpreted T-sentence is a partial definition of truth; the whole definition is their conjunction [Tarski]
19182 Use 'true' so that all T-sentences can be asserted, and the definition will then be 'adequate' [Tarski]
19198 We don't give conditions for asserting 'snow is white'; just that assertion implies 'snow is white' is true [Tarski]
15339 Tarski gave up on the essence of truth, and asked how truth is used, or how it functions [Tarski, by Horsten]
16302 Tarski did not just aim at a definition; he also offered an adequacy criterion for any truth definition [Tarski, by Halbach]
19135 Tarski enumerates cases of truth, so it can't be applied to new words or languages [Davidson on Tarski]
19138 Tarski define truths by giving the extension of the predicate, rather than the meaning [Davidson on Tarski]
4699 Tarski made truth relative, by only defining truth within some given artificial language [Tarski, by O'Grady]
19324 Tarski has to avoid stating how truths relate to states of affairs [Kirkham on Tarski]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
15410 Truth only applies to closed formulas, but we need satisfaction of open formulas to define it [Burgess on Tarski]
18811 Tarski uses sentential functions; truly assigning the objects to variables is what satisfies them [Tarski, by Rumfitt]
15365 We can define the truth predicate using 'true of' (satisfaction) for variables and some objects [Tarski, by Horsten]
19314 For physicalism, reduce truth to satisfaction, then define satisfaction as physical-plus-logic [Tarski, by Kirkham]
19316 Insight: don't use truth, use a property which can be compositional in complex quantified sentence [Tarski, by Kirkham]
19175 Tarski gave axioms for satisfaction, then derived its explicit definition, which led to defining truth [Tarski, by Davidson]
19184 The best truth definition involves other semantic notions, like satisfaction (relating terms and objects) [Tarski]
19191 Specify satisfaction for simple sentences, then compounds; true sentences are satisfied by all objects [Tarski]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
19188 We can't use a semantically closed language, or ditch our logic, so a meta-language is needed [Tarski]
19189 The metalanguage must contain the object language, logic, and defined semantics [Tarski]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
19134 Tarski defined truth for particular languages, but didn't define it across languages [Davidson on Tarski]
16304 Tarski didn't capture the notion of an adequate truth definition, as Convention T won't prove non-contradiction [Halbach on Tarski]
2571 Tarski says that his semantic theory of truth is completely neutral about all metaphysics [Tarski, by Haack]
10821 Physicalists should explain reference nonsemantically, rather than getting rid of it [Tarski, by Field,H]
10822 A physicalist account must add primitive reference to Tarski's theory [Field,H on Tarski]
10824 If listing equivalences is a reduction of truth, witchcraft is just a list of witch-victim pairs [Field,H on Tarski]
16303 Tarski made truth respectable, by proving that it could be defined [Tarski, by Halbach]
10969 Tarski had a theory of truth, and a theory of theories of truth [Tarski, by Read]
17746 Tarski's 'truth' is a precise relation between the language and its semantics [Tarski, by Walicki]
10904 Tarskian truth neglects the atomic sentences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith on Tarski]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
15322 Tarski's had the first axiomatic theory of truth that was minimally adequate [Tarski, by Horsten]
16306 Tarski defined truth, but an axiomatisation can be extracted from his inductive clauses [Tarski, by Halbach]
19141 Tarski thought axiomatic truth was too contingent, and in danger of inconsistencies [Tarski, by Davidson]
19190 We need an undefined term 'true' in the meta-language, specified by axioms [Tarski]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
19197 Truth can't be eliminated from universal claims, or from particular unspecified claims [Tarski]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
19185 Semantics is a very modest discipline which solves no real problems [Tarski]