Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Anaxarchus, Hilary Putnam and R.G. Collingwood
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14 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
6276
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'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green [Putnam]
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4714
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Putnam's epistemic notion of truth replaces the realism of correspondence with ontological relativism [Putnam, by O'Grady]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
6266
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We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science [Putnam]
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7617
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Before Kant, all philosophers had a correspondence theory of truth [Putnam]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
6277
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Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible [Putnam]
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4716
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The correspondence theory is wrong, because there is no one correspondence between reality and fact [Putnam, by O'Grady]
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3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
8828
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Truth is rational acceptability [Putnam]
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7616
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Truth is an idealisation of rational acceptability [Putnam]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
18951
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For scientific purposes there is a precise concept of 'true-in-L', using set theory [Putnam]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
6264
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In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language [Putnam]
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6265
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Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept [Putnam]
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6269
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Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true' [Putnam]
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2345
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Semantic notions do not occur in Tarski's definitions, but assessing their correctness involves translation [Putnam]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
2347
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Asserting the truth of an indexical statement is not the same as uttering the statement [Putnam]
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