Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Buddhaghosa, Euclid and Bertrand Russell
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21 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
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5420
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Truth is a property of a belief, but dependent on its external relations, not its internal qualities [Russell]
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
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14102
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What is true or false is not mental, and is best called 'propositions' [Russell]
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5784
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In its primary and formal sense, 'true' applies to propositions, not beliefs [Russell]
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6442
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Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences [Russell]
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5419
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Truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs and statements [Russell]
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 7. Falsehood
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5417
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A good theory of truth must make falsehood possible [Russell]
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16477
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Asserting not-p is saying p is false [Russell]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
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5777
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The truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers' [Russell]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
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6090
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Facts make propositions true or false, and are expressed by whole sentences [Russell]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
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21544
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It seems that when a proposition is false, something must fail to subsist [Russell]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 8. Making General Truths
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18348
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Not only atomic truths, but also general and negative truths, have truth-makers [Russell, by Rami]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
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6343
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For Russell, both propositions and facts are arrangements of objects, so obviously they correspond [Horwich on Russell]
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7395
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Truth as congruence may work for complex beliefs, but not for simple beliefs about existence [Joslin on Russell]
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5428
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Beliefs are true if they have corresponding facts, and false if they don't [Russell]
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5783
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Propositions of existence, generalities, disjunctions and hypotheticals make correspondence tricky [Russell]
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3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
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5421
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The coherence theory says falsehood is failure to cohere, and truth is fitting into a complete system of Truth [Russell]
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3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
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5422
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More than one coherent body of beliefs seems possible [Russell]
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5423
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If we suspend the law of contradiction, nothing will appear to be incoherent [Russell]
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5424
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Coherence is not the meaning of truth, but an important test for truth [Russell]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
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14454
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An argument 'satisfies' a function φx if φa is true [Russell]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
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14176
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"The death of Caesar is true" is not the same proposition as "Caesar died" [Russell]
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