Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Donald Davidson, Erik J. Olsson and Alfred Tarski

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81 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
6396 A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief [Davidson]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
16295 Tarski proved that truth cannot be defined from within a given theory [Tarski, by Halbach]
10153 In everyday language, truth seems indefinable, inconsistent, and illogical [Tarski]
15342 Tarski proved that any reasonably expressive language suffers from the liar paradox [Tarski, by Horsten]
19069 'True sentence' has no use consistent with logic and ordinary language, so definition seems hopeless [Tarski]
19178 Definitions of truth should not introduce a new version of the concept, but capture the old one [Tarski]
19177 A definition of truth should be materially adequate and formally correct [Tarski]
19186 A rigorous definition of truth is only possible in an exactly specified language [Tarski]
19194 We may eventually need to split the word 'true' into several less ambiguous terms [Tarski]
23295 Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler [Davidson]
19160 A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication [Davidson]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
23284 Plato's Forms confused truth with the most eminent truths, so only Truth itself is completely true [Davidson]
23286 Truth can't be a goal, because we can neither recognise it nor confim it [Davidson]
19151 Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard [Davidson]
23291 Without truth, both language and thought are impossible [Davidson]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
8188 Davidson takes truth to attach to individual sentences [Davidson, by Dummett]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
19144 'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify [Davidson]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
19044 Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
18702 Names, descriptions and predicates refer to things; without that, language and thought are baffling [Davidson]
23292 Correspondence can't be defined, but it shows how truth depends on the world [Davidson]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
16296 Tarski's Theorem renders any precise version of correspondence impossible [Tarski, by Halbach]
18902 Correspondence theories can't tell you what truths correspond to [Davidson]
23298 Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory [Davidson]
19148 There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to [Davidson]
19166 The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence [Davidson]
19167 Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing [Davidson]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
19081 Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds [Davidson, by Donnellan]
19150 Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief [Davidson]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
19196 Scheme (T) is not a definition of truth [Tarski]
15339 Tarski gave up on the essence of truth, and asked how truth is used, or how it functions [Tarski, by Horsten]
16302 Tarski did not just aim at a definition; he also offered an adequacy criterion for any truth definition [Tarski, by Halbach]
19135 Tarski enumerates cases of truth, so it can't be applied to new words or languages [Davidson on Tarski]
19138 Tarski define truths by giving the extension of the predicate, rather than the meaning [Davidson on Tarski]
4699 Tarski made truth relative, by only defining truth within some given artificial language [Tarski, by O'Grady]
19324 Tarski has to avoid stating how truths relate to states of affairs [Kirkham on Tarski]
10672 Tarskian semantics says that a sentence is true iff it is satisfied by every sequence [Tarski, by Hossack]
13338 '"It is snowing" is true if and only if it is snowing' is a partial definition of the concept of truth [Tarski]
19180 It is convenient to attach 'true' to sentences, and hence the language must be specified [Tarski]
19181 In the classical concept of truth, 'snow is white' is true if snow is white [Tarski]
19183 Each interpreted T-sentence is a partial definition of truth; the whole definition is their conjunction [Tarski]
19182 Use 'true' so that all T-sentences can be asserted, and the definition will then be 'adequate' [Tarski]
19198 We don't give conditions for asserting 'snow is white'; just that assertion implies 'snow is white' is true [Tarski]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
15410 Truth only applies to closed formulas, but we need satisfaction of open formulas to define it [Burgess on Tarski]
18811 Tarski uses sentential functions; truly assigning the objects to variables is what satisfies them [Tarski, by Rumfitt]
15365 We can define the truth predicate using 'true of' (satisfaction) for variables and some objects [Tarski, by Horsten]
19314 For physicalism, reduce truth to satisfaction, then define satisfaction as physical-plus-logic [Tarski, by Kirkham]
19316 Insight: don't use truth, use a property which can be compositional in complex quantified sentence [Tarski, by Kirkham]
19175 Tarski gave axioms for satisfaction, then derived its explicit definition, which led to defining truth [Tarski, by Davidson]
19184 The best truth definition involves other semantic notions, like satisfaction (relating terms and objects) [Tarski]
19191 Specify satisfaction for simple sentences, then compounds; true sentences are satisfied by all objects [Tarski]
19145 We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson]
19146 Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson]
19174 Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
19188 We can't use a semantically closed language, or ditch our logic, so a meta-language is needed [Tarski]
19189 The metalanguage must contain the object language, logic, and defined semantics [Tarski]
23288 When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept? [Davidson]
23297 The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
17746 Tarski's 'truth' is a precise relation between the language and its semantics [Tarski, by Walicki]
10904 Tarskian truth neglects the atomic sentences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith on Tarski]
2571 Tarski says that his semantic theory of truth is completely neutral about all metaphysics [Tarski, by Haack]
10821 Physicalists should explain reference nonsemantically, rather than getting rid of it [Tarski, by Field,H]
10822 A physicalist account must add primitive reference to Tarski's theory [Field,H on Tarski]
10824 If listing equivalences is a reduction of truth, witchcraft is just a list of witch-victim pairs [Field,H on Tarski]
19136 Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson]
19139 Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson]
19147 Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson]
19172 To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson]
10969 Tarski had a theory of truth, and a theory of theories of truth [Tarski, by Read]
19134 Tarski defined truth for particular languages, but didn't define it across languages [Davidson on Tarski]
16303 Tarski made truth respectable, by proving that it could be defined [Tarski, by Halbach]
16304 Tarski didn't capture the notion of an adequate truth definition, as Convention T won't prove non-contradiction [Halbach on Tarski]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
16306 Tarski defined truth, but an axiomatisation can be extracted from his inductive clauses [Tarski, by Halbach]
15322 Tarski's had the first axiomatic theory of truth that was minimally adequate [Tarski, by Horsten]
19141 Tarski thought axiomatic truth was too contingent, and in danger of inconsistencies [Tarski, by Davidson]
19190 We need an undefined term 'true' in the meta-language, specified by axioms [Tarski]
23296 We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts [Davidson]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
19197 Truth can't be eliminated from universal claims, or from particular unspecified claims [Tarski]
19153 Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
19185 Semantics is a very modest discipline which solves no real problems [Tarski]
23287 Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language [Davidson]
19170 Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson]