Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Donald Davidson, Richard Jeffrey and Charles Leslie Stevenson
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9 ideas
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
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19145
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We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson]
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19146
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Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson]
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19174
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Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
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23288
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When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept? [Davidson]
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23297
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The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
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19136
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Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson]
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19139
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Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson]
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19147
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Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson]
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19172
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To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson]
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