Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Epicurus, Engelbretsen,G/Sayward,C and Fraser MacBride
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these philosophers
display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
14 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
|
18486
|
We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation [MacBride]
|
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
|
14040
|
Observation and applied thought are always true [Epicurus]
|
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
|
18484
|
Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers [MacBride]
|
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
|
18466
|
If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride]
|
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
|
18481
|
Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein [MacBride]
|
|
18473
|
'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker [MacBride]
|
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
|
18483
|
The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters [MacBride]
|
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
|
18479
|
There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth [MacBride]
|
|
18477
|
There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths [MacBride]
|
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 8. Making General Truths
|
18482
|
Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths [MacBride]
|
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
|
18485
|
Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent [MacBride]
|
|
18474
|
Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have [MacBride]
|
|
18490
|
Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'? [MacBride]
|
|
18493
|
Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification [MacBride]
|