Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Hermarchus, Charles Sanders Peirce and Baruch de Spinoza
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13 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
21864
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Truth is its own standard [Spinoza]
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
8018
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Spinoza's life shows that love of truth which he proclaims as the highest value [MacIntyre on Spinoza]
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
19247
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The one unpardonable offence in reasoning is to block the route to further truth [Peirce]
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
5641
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For Spinoza, 'adequacy' is the intrinsic mark of truth [Spinoza, by Scruton]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
4816
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A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object [Spinoza]
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3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
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Truth is the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed by all investigators [Peirce]
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19095
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Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry [Peirce, by Misak]
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19097
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Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful [Peirce, by Misak]
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21494
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If truth is the end of enquiry, what if it never ends, or ends prematurely? [Atkin on Peirce]
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19246
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'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory [Peirce]
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15335
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Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us? [Horsten on Peirce]
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14796
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Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry [Peirce]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
14777
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That a judgement is true and that we judge it true are quite different things [Peirce]
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