Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Sren Kierkegaard and Trenton Merricks
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22 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
22092
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Kierkegaard's truth draws on authenticity, fidelity and honesty [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
15999
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Pure truth is for infinite beings only; I prefer endless striving for truth [Kierkegaard]
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
22094
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Subjective truth can only be sustained by repetition [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
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16005
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I recognise knowledge, but it is the truth by which I can live and die that really matters [Kierkegaard]
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5651
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Traditional views of truth are tautologies, and truth is empty without a subject [Kierkegaard, by Scruton]
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20313
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The highest truth we can get is uncertainty held fast by an inward passion [Kierkegaard]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
14415
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A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it [Merricks]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
14408
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Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear [Merricks]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
14395
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If a ball changes from red to white, Truthmaker says some thing must make the change true [Merricks]
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14398
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Truthmaker says if an entity is removed, some nonexistence truthmaker must replace it [Merricks]
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14403
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If Truthmaker says each truth is made by the existence of something, the theory had de re modality at is core [Merricks]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
14397
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Truthmaker demands not just a predication, but an existing state of affairs with essential ingredients [Merricks]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
14396
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If 'truth supervenes on being', worlds with the same entities, properties and relations have the same truths [Merricks]
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14400
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If truth supervenes on being, that won't explain why truth depends on being [Merricks]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
14394
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It is implausible that claims about non-existence are about existing things [Merricks]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
14390
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Truthmaker isn't the correspondence theory, because it offers no analysis of truth [Merricks]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
14412
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Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false [Merricks]
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14414
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I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me? [Merricks]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
14391
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If the correspondence theory is right, then necessary truths must correspond to something [Merricks]
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14418
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Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property [Merricks]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
19205
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'Snow is white' only contingently expresses the proposition that snow is white [Merricks]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
14419
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Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth [Merricks]
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