Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Thrasymachus, Alfred Tarski and Volker Halbach
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14 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
16330
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Truth-value 'gluts' allow two truth values together; 'gaps' give a partial conception of truth [Halbach]
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16339
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Truth axioms prove objects exist, so truth doesn't seem to be a logical notion [Halbach]
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
16295
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Tarski proved that truth cannot be defined from within a given theory [Tarski, by Halbach]
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15342
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Tarski proved that any reasonably expressive language suffers from the liar paradox [Tarski, by Horsten]
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19069
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'True sentence' has no use consistent with logic and ordinary language, so definition seems hopeless [Tarski]
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10153
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In everyday language, truth seems indefinable, inconsistent, and illogical [Tarski]
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19178
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Definitions of truth should not introduce a new version of the concept, but capture the old one [Tarski]
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19177
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A definition of truth should be materially adequate and formally correct [Tarski]
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19186
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A rigorous definition of truth is only possible in an exactly specified language [Tarski]
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19194
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We may eventually need to split the word 'true' into several less ambiguous terms [Tarski]
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16324
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Any definition of truth requires a metalanguage [Halbach]
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15647
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Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
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16293
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Traditional definitions of truth often make it more obscure, rather than less [Halbach]
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16301
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If people have big doubts about truth, a definition might give it more credibility [Halbach]
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