Combining Philosophers
Ideas for William James, James O. Young and Lawrence M. Krauss
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14 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
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6710
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You can only define a statement that something is 'true' by referring to its functional possibilities [James]
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
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18986
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Truth is just a name for verification-processes [James]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
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19079
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For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct [Young,JO]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
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18983
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In many cases there is no obvious way in which ideas can agree with their object [James]
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3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
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18972
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Ideas are true in so far as they co-ordinate our experiences [James]
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18973
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New opinions count as 'true' if they are assimilated to an individual's current beliefs [James]
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19076
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Coherence theories differ over the coherence relation, and over the set of proposition with which to cohere [Young,JO]
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19077
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Two propositions could be consistent with your set, but inconsistent with one another [Young,JO]
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19078
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Coherence with actual beliefs, or our best beliefs, or ultimate ideal beliefs? [Young,JO]
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19084
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Coherent truth is not with an arbitrary set of beliefs, but with a set which people actually do believe [Young,JO]
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3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
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19083
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How do you identify the best coherence set; and aren't there truths which don't cohere? [Young,JO]
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3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
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18984
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True ideas are those we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify (and false otherwise) [James]
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22305
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If the hypothesis of God is widely successful, it is true [James]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
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19075
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Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions [Young,JO]
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