Combining Philosophers
Ideas for William James, Pascal Engel and John Kekes
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15 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
6710
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You can only define a statement that something is 'true' by referring to its functional possibilities [James]
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
4737
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Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances? [Engel]
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
18986
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Truth is just a name for verification-processes [James]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
4750
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The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p' [Engel]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
18983
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In many cases there is no obvious way in which ideas can agree with their object [James]
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4744
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We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts [Engel]
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3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
18972
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Ideas are true in so far as they co-ordinate our experiences [James]
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18973
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New opinions count as 'true' if they are assimilated to an individual's current beliefs [James]
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4738
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The coherence theory says truth is an internal relationship between groups of truth-bearers [Engel]
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3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
4745
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Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs [Engel]
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3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
22305
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If the hypothesis of God is widely successful, it is true [James]
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18984
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True ideas are those we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify (and false otherwise) [James]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
4755
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Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons [Engel]
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4753
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Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions [Engel]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
4751
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Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic [Engel]
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