display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
20 ideas
18194 | 'Forcing' can produce new models of ZFC from old models [Maddy] |
Full Idea: Cohen's method of 'forcing' produces a new model of ZFC from an old model by appending a carefully chosen 'generic' set. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.4) |
18195 | A Large Cardinal Axiom would assert ever-increasing stages in the hierarchy [Maddy] |
Full Idea: A possible axiom is the Large Cardinal Axiom, which asserts that there are more and more stages in the cumulative hierarchy. Infinity can be seen as the first of these stages, and Replacement pushes further in this direction. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.5) |
13011 | New axioms are being sought, to determine the size of the continuum [Maddy] |
Full Idea: In current set theory, the search is on for new axioms to determine the size of the continuum. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Believing the Axioms I [1988], §0) | |
A reaction: This sounds the wrong way round. Presumably we seek axioms that fix everything else about set theory, and then check to see what continuum results. Otherwise we could just pick our continuum, by picking our axioms. |
10166 | ZFC set theory has only 'pure' sets, without 'urelements' [Reck/Price] |
Full Idea: In standard ZFC ('Zermelo-Fraenkel with Choice') set theory we deal merely with pure sets, not with additional urelements. | |
From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §2) | |
A reaction: The 'urelements' would the actual objects that are members of the sets, be they physical or abstract. This idea is crucial to understanding philosophy of mathematics, and especially logicism. Must the sets exist, just as the urelements do? |
13013 | The Axiom of Extensionality seems to be analytic [Maddy] |
Full Idea: Most writers agree that if any sense can be made of the distinction between analytic and synthetic, then the Axiom of Extensionality should be counted as analytic. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Believing the Axioms I [1988], §1.1) | |
A reaction: [Boolos is the source of the idea] In other words Extensionality is not worth discussing, because it simply tells you what the world 'set' means, and there is no room for discussion about that. The set/class called 'humans' varies in size. |
13014 | Extensional sets are clearer, simpler, unique and expressive [Maddy] |
Full Idea: The extensional view of sets is preferable because it is simpler, clearer, and more convenient, because it individuates uniquely, and because it can simulate intensional notions when the need arises. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Believing the Axioms I [1988], §1.1) | |
A reaction: [She cites Fraenkel, Bar-Hillet and Levy for this] The difficulty seems to be whether the extensional notion captures our ordinary intuitive notion of what constitutes a group of things, since that needs flexible size and some sort of unity. |
13022 | Infinite sets are essential for giving an account of the real numbers [Maddy] |
Full Idea: If one is interested in analysis then infinite sets are indispensable since even the notion of a real number cannot be developed by means of finite sets alone. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Believing the Axioms I [1988], §1.5) | |
A reaction: [Maddy is citing Fraenkel, Bar-Hillel and Levy] So Cantor's great breakthrough (Idea 13021) actually follows from the earlier acceptance of the real numbers, so that's where the departure from common sense started. |
13021 | The Axiom of Infinity states Cantor's breakthrough that launched modern mathematics [Maddy] |
Full Idea: The Axiom of Infinity is a simple statement of Cantor's great breakthrough. His bold hypothesis that a collection of elements that had lurked in the background of mathematics could be infinite launched modern mathematics. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Believing the Axioms I [1988], §1.5) | |
A reaction: It also embodies one of those many points where mathematics seems to depart from common sense - but then most subjects depart from common sense when they get more sophisticated. Look what happened to art. |
18191 | Axiom of Infinity: completed infinite collections can be treated mathematically [Maddy] |
Full Idea: The axiom of infinity: that there are infinite sets is to claim that completed infinite collections can be treated mathematically. In its standard contemporary form, the axioms assert the existence of the set of all finite ordinals. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.3) |
13023 | The Power Set Axiom is needed for, and supported by, accounts of the continuum [Maddy] |
Full Idea: The Power Set Axiom is indispensable for a set-theoretic account of the continuum, ...and in so far as those attempts are successful, then the power-set principle gains some confirmatory support. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Believing the Axioms I [1988], §1.6) | |
A reaction: The continuum is, of course, notoriously problematic. Have we created an extra problem in our attempts at solving the first one? |
18193 | The Axiom of Foundation says every set exists at a level in the set hierarchy [Maddy] |
Full Idea: In the presence of other axioms, the Axiom of Foundation is equivalent to the claim that every set is a member of some Vα. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.3) |
13024 | Efforts to prove the Axiom of Choice have failed [Maddy] |
Full Idea: Jordain made consistent and ill-starred efforts to prove the Axiom of Choice. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Believing the Axioms I [1988], §1.7) | |
A reaction: This would appear to be the fate of most axioms. You would presumably have to use a different system from the one you are engaged with to achieve your proof. |
13025 | Modern views say the Choice set exists, even if it can't be constructed [Maddy] |
Full Idea: Resistance to the Axiom of Choice centred on opposition between existence and construction. Modern set theory thrives on a realistic approach which says the choice set exists, regardless of whether it can be defined, constructed, or given by a rule. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Believing the Axioms I [1988], §1.7) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a key case for the ontology that lies at the heart of theory. Choice seems to be an invaluable tool for proofs, so it won't go away, so admit it to the ontology. Hm. So the tools of thought have existence? |
13026 | A large array of theorems depend on the Axiom of Choice [Maddy] |
Full Idea: Many theorems depend on the Axiom of Choice, including that a countable union of sets is countable, and results in analysis, topology, abstract algebra and mathematical logic. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Believing the Axioms I [1988], §1.7) | |
A reaction: The modern attitude seems to be to admit anything if it leads to interesting results. It makes you wonder about the modern approach of using mathematics and logic as the cutting edges of ontological thinking. |
17610 | The Axiom of Choice paradoxically allows decomposing a sphere into two identical spheres [Maddy] |
Full Idea: One feature of the Axiom of Choice that troubled many mathematicians was the so-called Banach-Tarski paradox: using the Axiom, a sphere can be decomposed into finitely many parts and those parts reassembled into two spheres the same size as the original. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Defending the Axioms [2011], 1.3) | |
A reaction: (The key is that the parts are non-measurable). To an outsider it is puzzling that the Axiom has been universally accepted, even though it produces such a result. Someone can explain that, I'm sure. |
18169 | Axiom of Reducibility: propositional functions are extensionally predicative [Maddy] |
Full Idea: The Axiom of Reducibility states that every propositional function is extensionally equivalent to some predicative proposition function. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], I.1) |
13019 | The Iterative Conception says everything appears at a stage, derived from the preceding appearances [Maddy] |
Full Idea: The Iterative Conception (Zermelo 1930) says everything appears at some stage. Given two objects a and b, let A and B be the stages at which they first appear. Suppose B is after A. Then the pair set of a and b appears at the immediate stage after B. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Believing the Axioms I [1988], §1.3) | |
A reaction: Presumably this all happens in 'logical time' (a nice phrase I have just invented!). I suppose we might say that the existence of the paired set is 'forced' by the preceding sets. No transcendental inferences in this story? |
13018 | Limitation of Size is a vague intuition that over-large sets may generate paradoxes [Maddy] |
Full Idea: The 'limitation of size' is a vague intuition, based on the idea that being too large may generate the paradoxes. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Believing the Axioms I [1988], §1.3) | |
A reaction: This is an intriguing idea to be found right at the centre of what is supposed to be an incredibly rigorous system. |
17824 | The master science is physical objects divided into sets [Maddy] |
Full Idea: The master science can be thought of as the theory of sets with the entire range of physical objects as ur-elements. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Sets and Numbers [1981], II) | |
A reaction: This sounds like Quine's view, since we have to add sets to our naturalistic ontology of objects. It seems to involve unrestricted mereology to create normal objects. |
8755 | Maddy replaces pure sets with just objects and perceived sets of objects [Maddy, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Maddy dispenses with pure sets, by sketching a strong set theory in which everything is either a physical object or a set of sets of ...physical objects. Eventually a physiological story of perception will extend to sets of physical objects. | |
From: report of Penelope Maddy (Realism in Mathematics [1990]) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 8.3 | |
A reaction: This doesn't seem to find many supporters, but if we accept the perception of resemblances as innate (as in Hume and Quine), it is isn't adding much to see that we intrinsically see things in groups. |