Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Herodotus, Dorothy Edgington and Sextus Empiricus

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4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / c. Derivation rules of PL
14273 Conditional Proof is only valid if we accept the truth-functional reading of 'if' [Edgington]
     Full Idea: Conditional Proof seems sound: 'From X and Y, it follows that Z. So from X it follows that if Y,Z'. Yet for no reading of 'if' which is stronger that the truth-functional reading is CP valid, at least if we accept ¬(A&¬B);A; therefore B.
     From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals (Stanf) [2006], 2.2)
     A reaction: See the section of ideas on Conditionals (filed under 'Modality') for a fuller picture of this issue. Edgington offers it as one of the main arguments in favour of the truth-functional reading of 'if' (though she rejects that reading).