Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Herodotus, Georg W.F.Hegel and E.J. Lemmon

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40 ideas

4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
'Contradictory' propositions always differ in truth-value [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: Two propositions are 'contradictory' if they are never both true and never both false either, which means that ¬(A↔B) is a tautology.
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.3)
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / a. Symbols of PL
We write the conditional 'if P (antecedent) then Q (consequent)' as P→Q [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: We write 'if P then Q' as P→Q. This is called a 'conditional', with P as its 'antecedent', and Q as its 'consequent'.
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 1.2)
     A reaction: P→Q can also be written as ¬P∨Q.
That proposition that either P or Q is their 'disjunction', written P∨Q [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: If P and Q are any two propositions, the proposition that either P or Q is called the 'disjunction' of P and Q, and is written P∨Q.
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 1.3)
     A reaction: This is inclusive-or (meaning 'P, or Q, or both'), and not exlusive-or (Boolean XOR), which means 'P, or Q, but not both'. The ∨ sign is sometimes called 'vel' (Latin).
We write the 'negation' of P (not-P) as ¬ [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: We write 'not-P' as ¬P. This is called the 'negation' of P. The 'double negation' of P (not not-P) would be written as ¬¬P.
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 1.2)
     A reaction: Lemmons use of -P is no longer in use for 'not'. A tilde sign (squiggle) is also used for 'not', but some interpreters give that a subtly different meaning (involving vagueness). The sign ¬ is sometimes called 'hook' or 'corner'.
We write 'P if and only if Q' as P↔Q; it is also P iff Q, or (P→Q)∧(Q→P) [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: We write 'P if and only if Q' as P↔Q. It is called the 'biconditional', often abbreviate in writing as 'iff'. It also says that P is both sufficient and necessary for Q, and may be written out in full as (P→Q)∧(Q→P).
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 1.4)
     A reaction: If this symbol is found in a sequence, the first move in a proof is to expand it to the full version.
If A and B are 'interderivable' from one another we may write A -||- B [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: If we say that A and B are 'interderivable' from one another (that is, A |- B and B |- A), then we may write A -||- B.
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 1.5)
That proposition that both P and Q is their 'conjunction', written P∧Q [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: If P and Q are any two propositions, the proposition that both P and Q is called the 'conjunction' of P and Q, and is written P∧Q.
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 1.3)
     A reaction: [I use the more fashionable inverted-v '∧', rather than Lemmon's '&', which no longer seems to be used] P∧Q can also be defined as ¬(¬P∨¬Q)
The sign |- may be read as 'therefore' [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: I introduce the sign |- to mean 'we may validly conclude'. To call it the 'assertion sign' is misleading. It may conveniently be read as 'therefore'.
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 1.2)
     A reaction: [Actually no gap between the vertical and horizontal strokes of the sign] As well as meaning 'assertion', it may also mean 'it is a theorem that' (with no proof shown).
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / b. Terminology of PL
A 'well-formed formula' follows the rules for variables, ¬, →, ∧, ∨, and ↔ [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: A 'well-formed formula' of the propositional calculus is a sequence of symbols which follows the rules for variables, ¬, →, ∧, ∨, and ↔.
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.1)
The 'scope' of a connective is the connective, the linked formulae, and the brackets [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: The 'scope' of a connective in a certain formula is the formulae linked by the connective, together with the connective itself and the (theoretically) encircling brackets
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.1)
A 'substitution-instance' is a wff formed by consistent replacing variables with wffs [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: A 'substitution-instance' is a wff which results by replacing one or more variables throughout with the same wffs (the same wff replacing each variable).
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.2)
A wff is 'inconsistent' if all assignments to variables result in the value F [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: If a well-formed formula of propositional calculus takes the value F for all possible assignments of truth-values to its variables, it is said to be 'inconsistent'.
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.3)
'Contrary' propositions are never both true, so that ¬(A∧B) is a tautology [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: If A and B are expressible in propositional calculus notation, they are 'contrary' if they are never both true, which may be tested by the truth-table for ¬(A∧B), which is a tautology if they are contrary.
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.3)
Two propositions are 'equivalent' if they mirror one another's truth-value [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: Two propositions are 'equivalent' if whenever A is true B is true, and whenever B is true A is true, in which case A↔B is a tautology.
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.3)
A wff is 'contingent' if produces at least one T and at least one F [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: If a well-formed formula of propositional calculus takes at least one T and at least one F for all the assignments of truth-values to its variables, it is said to be 'contingent'.
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.3)
'Subcontrary' propositions are never both false, so that A∨B is a tautology [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: If A and B are expressible in propositional calculus notation, they are 'subcontrary' if they are never both false, which may be tested by the truth-table for A∨B, which is a tautology if they are subcontrary.
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.3)
A 'implies' B if B is true whenever A is true (so that A→B is tautologous) [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: One proposition A 'implies' a proposition B if whenever A is true B is true (but not necessarily conversely), which is only the case if A→B is tautologous. Hence B 'is implied' by A.
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.3)
A wff is a 'tautology' if all assignments to variables result in the value T [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: If a well-formed formula of propositional calculus takes the value T for all possible assignments of truth-values to its variables, it is said to be a 'tautology'.
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.3)
A 'theorem' is the conclusion of a provable sequent with zero assumptions [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: A 'theorem' of logic is the conclusion of a provable sequent in which the number of assumptions is zero.
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.2)
     A reaction: This is what Quine and others call a 'logical truth'.
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / c. Derivation rules of PL
DN: Given A, we may derive ¬¬A [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: Double Negation (DN): Given A, we may derive ¬¬A as a conclusion, and vice versa. The conclusion depends on the assumptions of the premiss.
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 1.5)
A: we may assume any proposition at any stage [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: Assumptions (A): any proposition may be introduced at any stage of a proof.
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 1.5)
∧E: Given A∧B, we may derive either A or B separately [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: And-Elimination (∧E): Given A∧B, we may derive either A or B separately. The conclusions will depend on the assumptions of the premiss.
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 1.5)
∧I: Given A and B, we may derive A∧B [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: And-Introduction (&I): Given A and B, we may derive A∧B as conclusion. This depends on their previous assumptions.
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 1.5)
CP: Given a proof of B from A as assumption, we may derive A→B [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: Conditional Proof (CP): Given a proof of B from A as assumption, we may derive A→B as conclusion, on the remaining assumptions (if any).
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 1.5)
MPP: Given A and A→B, we may derive B [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: Modus Ponendo Ponens (MPP): Given A and A→B, we may derive B as a conclusion. B will rest on any assumptions that have been made.
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 1.5)
RAA: If assuming A will prove B∧¬B, then derive ¬A [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: Reduction ad Absurdum (RAA): Given a proof of B∧¬B from A as assumption, we may derive ¬A as conclusion, depending on the remaining assumptions (if any).
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 1.5)
MTT: Given ¬B and A→B, we derive ¬A [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: Modus Tollendo Tollens (MTT): Given ¬B and A→B, we derive ¬A as a conclusion. ¬A depends on any assumptions that have been made
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 1.5)
∨I: Given either A or B separately, we may derive A∨B [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: Or-Introduction (∨I): Given either A or B separately, we may derive A∨B as conclusion. This depends on the assumption of the premisses.
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 1.5)
∨E: Derive C from A∨B, if C can be derived both from A and from B [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: Or-Elimination (∨E): Given A∨B, we may derive C if it is proved from A as assumption and from B as assumption. This will also depend on prior assumptions.
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 1.5)
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / d. Basic theorems of PL
'Modus tollendo ponens' (MTP) says ¬P, P ∨ Q |- Q [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: 'Modus tollendo ponens' (MTP) says that if a disjunction holds and also the negation of one of its disjuncts, then the other disjunct holds. Thus ¬P, P ∨ Q |- Q may be introduced as a theorem.
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.2)
     A reaction: Unlike Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens, this is a derived rule.
'Modus ponendo tollens' (MPT) says P, ¬(P ∧ Q) |- ¬Q [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: 'Modus ponendo tollens' (MPT) says that if the negation of a conjunction holds and also one of its conjuncts, then the negation of the other conjunct holds. Thus P, ¬(P ∧ Q) |- ¬Q may be introduced as a theorem.
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.2)
     A reaction: Unlike Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens, this is a derived rule.
We can change conditionals into negated conjunctions with P→Q -||- ¬(P ∧ ¬Q) [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: The proof that P→Q -||- ¬(P ∧ ¬Q) is useful for enabling us to change conditionals into negated conjunctions
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.2)
We can change conditionals into disjunctions with P→Q -||- ¬P ∨ Q [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: The proof that P→Q -||- ¬P ∨ Q is useful for enabling us to change conditionals into disjunctions.
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.2)
De Morgan's Laws make negated conjunctions/disjunctions into non-negated disjunctions/conjunctions [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: The forms of De Morgan's Laws [P∨Q -||- ¬(¬P ∧ ¬Q); ¬(P∨Q) -||- ¬P ∧ ¬Q; ¬(P∧Q) -||- ¬P ∨ ¬Q); P∧Q -||- ¬(¬P∨¬Q)] transform negated conjunctions and disjunctions into non-negated disjunctions and conjunctions respectively.
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.2)
The Distributive Laws can rearrange a pair of conjunctions or disjunctions [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: The Distributive Laws say that P ∧ (Q∨R) -||- (P∧Q) ∨ (P∧R), and that P ∨ (Q∨R) -||- (P∨Q) ∧ (P∨R)
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.2)
We can change conjunctions into negated conditionals with P→Q -||- ¬(P → ¬Q) [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: The proof that P∧Q -||- ¬(P → ¬Q) is useful for enabling us to change conjunctions into negated conditionals.
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.2)
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
Truth-tables are good for showing invalidity [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: The truth-table approach enables us to show the invalidity of argument-patterns, as well as their validity.
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.4)
A truth-table test is entirely mechanical, but this won't work for more complex logic [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: A truth-table test is entirely mechanical, ..and in propositional logic we can even generate proofs mechanically for tautological sequences, ..but this mechanical approach breaks down with predicate calculus, and proof-discovery is an imaginative process.
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.5)
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 4. Soundness of PL
If any of the nine rules of propositional logic are applied to tautologies, the result is a tautology [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: If any application of the nine derivation rules of propositional logic is made on tautologous sequents, we have demonstrated that the result is always a tautologous sequent. Thus the system is consistent.
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.4)
     A reaction: The term 'sound' tends to be used now, rather than 'consistent'. See Lemmon for the proofs of each of the nine rules.
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 5. Completeness of PL
Propositional logic is complete, since all of its tautologous sequents are derivable [Lemmon]
     Full Idea: A logical system is complete is all expressions of a specified kind are derivable in it. If we specify tautologous sequent-expressions, then propositional logic is complete, because we can show that all tautologous sequents are derivable.
     From: E.J. Lemmon (Beginning Logic [1965], 2.5)
     A reaction: [See Lemmon 2.5 for details of the proofs]