Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Herodotus, Michael D. Resnik and Kurt Gdel

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6 ideas

4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
Axioms are often affirmed simply because they produce results which have been accepted [Resnik]
     Full Idea: Many axioms have been proposed, not on the grounds that they can be directly known, but rather because they produce a desired body of previously recognised results.
     From: Michael D. Resnik (Maths as a Science of Patterns [1997], One.5.1)
     A reaction: This is the perennial problem with axioms - whether we start from them, or whether we deduce them after the event. There is nothing wrong with that, just as we might infer the existence of quarks because of their results.
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 3. Completeness of PC
Gödel proved the completeness of first order predicate logic in 1930 [Gödel, by Walicki]
     Full Idea: Gödel proved the completeness of first order predicate logic in his doctoral dissertation of 1930.
     From: report of Kurt Gödel (Completeness of Axioms of Logic [1930]) by Michal Walicki - Introduction to Mathematical Logic History E.2.2
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
We perceive the objects of set theory, just as we perceive with our senses [Gödel]
     Full Idea: We have something like perception of the objects of set theory, shown by the axioms forcing themselves on us as being true. I don't see why we should have less confidence in this kind of perception (i.e. mathematical intuition) than in sense perception.
     From: Kurt Gödel (What is Cantor's Continuum Problem? [1964], p.483), quoted by Michčle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 2.4
     A reaction: A famous strong expression of realism about the existence of sets. It is remarkable how the ingredients of mathematics spread themselves before the mind like a landscape, inviting journeys - but I think that just shows how minds cope with abstractions.
Gödel show that the incompleteness of set theory was a necessity [Gödel, by Hallett,M]
     Full Idea: Gödel's incompleteness results of 1931 show that all axiom systems precise enough to satisfy Hilbert's conception are necessarily incomplete.
     From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Michael Hallett - Introduction to Zermelo's 1930 paper p.1215
     A reaction: [Hallett italicises 'necessarily'] Hilbert axioms have to be recursive - that is, everything in the system must track back to them.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / o. Axiom of Constructibility V = L
Gödel proved the classical relative consistency of the axiom V = L [Gödel, by Putnam]
     Full Idea: Gödel proved the classical relative consistency of the axiom V = L (which implies the axiom of choice and the generalized continuum hypothesis). This established the full independence of the continuum hypothesis from the other axioms.
     From: report of Kurt Gödel (What is Cantor's Continuum Problem? [1964]) by Hilary Putnam - Mathematics without Foundations
     A reaction: Gödel initially wanted to make V = L an axiom, but the changed his mind. Maddy has lots to say on the subject.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
In simple type theory the axiom of Separation is better than Reducibility [Gödel, by Linsky,B]
     Full Idea: In the superior realist and simple theory of types, the place of the axiom of reducibility is not taken by the axiom of classes, Zermelo's Aussonderungsaxiom.
     From: report of Kurt Gödel (Russell's Mathematical Logic [1944], p.140-1) by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 6.1 n3
     A reaction: This is Zermelo's Axiom of Separation, but that too is not an axiom of standard ZFC.