Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Anaxarchus, Mark Colyvan and Theodore Sider
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17 ideas
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / b. Terminology of PL
13689
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'Theorems' are formulas provable from no premises at all [Sider]
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4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
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Truth tables assume truth functionality, and are just pictures of truth functions [Sider]
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4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / c. System D
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Intuitively, deontic accessibility seems not to be reflexive, but to be serial [Sider]
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13710
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In D we add that 'what is necessary is possible'; then tautologies are possible, and contradictions not necessary [Sider]
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4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / f. System B
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System B introduces iterated modalities [Sider]
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4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
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S5 is the strongest system, since it has the most valid formulas, because it is easy to be S5-valid [Sider]
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4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 5. Epistemic Logic
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Epistemic accessibility is reflexive, and allows positive and negative introspection (KK and K¬K) [Sider]
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4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 6. Temporal Logic
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We can treat modal worlds as different times [Sider]
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4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
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Converse Barcan Formula: □∀αφ→∀α□φ [Sider]
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13718
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The Barcan Formula ∀x□Fx→□∀xFx may be a defect in modal logic [Sider]
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13723
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System B is needed to prove the Barcan Formula [Sider]
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15023
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The Barcan schema implies if X might have fathered something, there is something X might have fathered [Sider]
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4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
13715
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You can employ intuitionist logic without intuitionism about mathematics [Sider]
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17926
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Rejecting double negation elimination undermines reductio proofs [Colyvan]
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17925
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Showing a disproof is impossible is not a proof, so don't eliminate double negation [Colyvan]
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4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
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'Gunk' is an object in which proper parts all endlessly have further proper parts [Sider]
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4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
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Which should be primitive in mereology - part, or overlap? [Sider]
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