Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Anon (Dan), Robert C. Stalnaker and Alcmaeon

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic

12766	Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker]
	Full Idea: Logical space is not given independently of the individuals that occupy it, but is abstracted from the world as we find it.
	From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Anti-essentialism [1979], p.85)
	A reaction: I very much like the second half of this idea, and am delighted to find Stalnaker endorsing it. I take the logical connectives to be descriptions of how things behave, at a high level of generality.

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form

16464	We regiment to get semantic structure, for evaluating arguments, and understanding complexities [Stalnaker]
	Full Idea: The point of regimentation is to give a perspicuous representation of the semantic structure of an expression, making it easier to evaluate the validity of arguments and to interpret complex statements.
	From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Mere Possibilities [2012], 4.2)
	A reaction: This is an authoritative summary from an expert of why all philosophers must take an interest in logical form.

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / e. or

16465	In 'S was F or some other than S was F', the disjuncts need S, but the whole disjunction doesn't [Stalnaker]
	Full Idea: In 'either Socrates was a philosopher or someone other than Socrates was a philosopher', both propositions expressed by the disjuncts depend for their existence on the existence of Socrates, but the whole disjunction does not.
	From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Mere Possibilities [2012], 4.2)
	A reaction: Nice example, just the sort of thing we pay philosophers to come up with. He is claiming that propositions can exist in possible worlds in which the individuals mentioned do not exist.

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential

16405	To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker]
	Full Idea: If we ask 'what must you know to understand a name?', the naïve answer is that one must know who or what it names - nothing more. (But no one would give this answer about what is needed to understand a definite description).
	From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Reference and Necessity [1997], 4)
	A reaction: Presumably this is naive because names can be full of meaning ('the Empress'), or description and reference together ('there's the man who robbed me') and so on. It's a nice starting point though. A number can serve as a name.