Combining Philosophers

Ideas for B Hale / C Wright, Edmund Husserl and Beth Lord

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic

21222	Logicians presuppose a world, and ignore logic/world connections, so their logic is impure [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
	Full Idea: Husserl maintained that because most logicians have not studied the connection between logic and the world, logic did not achieve its status of purity. Even more, their logic implicitly presupposed a world.
	From: report of Edmund Husserl (Formal and Transcendental Logic [1929]) by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 4.5.1
	A reaction: The point here is that the bracketing of phenomenology, to reach an understanding with no presuppositions, is impossible if you don't realise what your are presupposing. I think the logic/world relationship is badly neglected, thanks to Frege.

21223	Phenomenology grounds logic in subjective experience [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
	Full Idea: The phenomenological logic grounds logical notions in subjective acts of experience.
	From: report of Edmund Husserl (Formal and Transcendental Logic [1929], p.183) by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 4.5.1
	A reaction: I'll approach this with great caution, but this is a line of thought that appeals to me. The core assumptions of logic do not arise ex nihilo.

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms

12230	Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright]
	Full Idea: Anyone should agree that a justification for regarding a singular term as having objectual reference is provided just as soon as one has justification for regarding as true certain atomic statements in which it functions as a singular term.
	From: B Hale / C Wright (The Metaontology of Abstraction [2009], §9)
	A reaction: The meat of this idea is hidden in the word 'certain'. See Idea 10314 for Hale's explanation. Without that, the proposal strikes me as absurd.

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / c. Grelling's paradox

10631	If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright]
	Full Idea: If we stipulate that 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, we speedily arrive at the contradiction that 'heterological' is itself heterological just in case it is not.
	From: B Hale / C Wright (Intro to 'The Reason's Proper Study' [2001], 3.2)