display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
98 ideas
6110 | Subject-predicate logic (and substance-attribute metaphysics) arise from Aryan languages [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is doubtful whether the subject-predicate logic, with the substance-attribute metaphysic, would have been invented by people speaking a non-Aryan language. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.151) | |
A reaction: This is not far off the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis (e.g. Idea 3917), which Russell would never accept. I presume that Russell would see true logic as running deeper, and the 'Aryan' approach as just one possible way to describe it. |
8219 | Logic has an infantile idea of philosophy [Deleuze/Guattari] |
Full Idea: Logic has an infantile idea of philosophy. | |
From: G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 1.1) | |
A reaction: This offers some explanation of why Anglo-American philosophers are steeped in logic, and the continentals just ignore it. I have some sympathy with the French view. Logic seems to study language with all the interesting part drained off. |
21588 | Logic gives the method of research in philosophy [Russell] |
Full Idea: Logic gives the method of research in philosophy, just as mathematics gives the method in physics. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Our Knowledge of the External World [1914], 8) | |
A reaction: I'm struck by how rarely philosophers actually prove anything. Mostly they just use the language of logic as a tool for disambiguation. Only a tiny handful of philosophers can actually create sustained and novel proofs. |
6107 | It is logic, not metaphysics, that is fundamental to philosophy [Russell] |
Full Idea: I hold that logic is what is fundamental in philosophy, and that schools should be characterised rather by their logic than by their metaphysics. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.143) | |
A reaction: Personally I disagree. Russell seems to have been most interested in the logical form underlying language, but that seems to be because he was interested in the ontological implications of what we say, which is metaphysics. |
8246 | Logic hates philosophy, and wishes to supplant it [Deleuze/Guattari] |
Full Idea: A real hatred inspires logic's rivalry with, or its will to supplant, philosophy. | |
From: G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 2.6) | |
A reaction: A delightful corrective to the neurotic inferiority that most English-speaking philosophers feel about their failure to master logic. What was Aristotle playing at when he invented logic? Philosophical talent is utterly different from a talent for logic. |
14452 | All the propositions of logic are completely general [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is part of the definition of logic that all its propositions are completely general. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XV) |
16486 | The physical world doesn't need logic, but the mental world does [Russell] |
Full Idea: The non-mental world can be completely described without the use of any logical word, …but when it comes to the mental world, there are facts which cannot be mentioned without the use of logical words. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: He adds that logical words are not needed for physics, but are needed for psychology. I love Russell's interest in the psychology of logic (in defiance of the anti-psychologism of Frege). See also the ideas of Robert Hanna. |
21495 | Theoretical and practical politics are both concerned with the best lives for individuals [Russell] |
Full Idea: Political ideals must be based upon ideals for the individual life. The aim of politics should be to make the lives of individuals as good as possible. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Political Ideals [1917], 1) | |
A reaction: Russell floats between socialism and anarchism, but this foundational remark is classic liberalism. |
14462 | In modern times, logic has become mathematical, and mathematics has become logical [Russell] |
Full Idea: Logic has become more mathematical, and mathematics has become more logical. The consequence is that it has now become wholly impossible to draw a line between the two; in fact, the two are one. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVIII) | |
A reaction: This appears to be true even if you reject logicism about mathematics. Logicism is sometimes rejected because it always ends up with a sneaky ontological commitment, but maybe mathematics shares exactly the same commitment. |
5395 | Demonstration always relies on the rule that anything implied by a truth is true [Russell] |
Full Idea: All demonstrations involve the principle that 'anything implied by a true proposition is true', or 'whatever follows from a true proposition is true'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 7) | |
A reaction: This is modus ponens, a broad principle of rationality, rather than of strict logicality, because it covers practical inferences and vague propositions. Presumably truth is a prior concept to implication, and therefore more metaphysically basic. |
14106 | Implication cannot be defined [Russell] |
Full Idea: A definition of implication is quite impossible. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §016) |
14108 | It would be circular to use 'if' and 'then' to define material implication [Russell] |
Full Idea: It would be a vicious circle to define material implication as meaning that if one proposition is true, then another is true, for 'if' and 'then' already involve implication. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §037) | |
A reaction: Hence the preference for defining it by the truth table, or as 'not-p or q'. |
14464 | Logic can be known a priori, without study of the actual world [Russell] |
Full Idea: Logical propositions are such as can be known a priori, without study of the actual world. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVIII) | |
A reaction: This remark constrasts strikingly with Idea 12444, which connects logic to the actual world. Is it therefore a priori synthetic? |
14167 | The only classes are things, predicates and relations [Russell] |
Full Idea: The only classes appear to be things, predicates and relations. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §440) | |
A reaction: This is the first-order logic view of reality, which has begun to look incredibly impoverished in modern times. Processes certainly demand a hearing, as do modal facts. |
10057 | Logic can only assert hypothetical existence [Russell] |
Full Idea: No proposition of logic can assert 'existence' except under a hypothesis. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVIII) | |
A reaction: I am prepared to accept this view fairly dogmatically, though Musgrave shows some of the difficulties of the if-thenist view (depending on which 'order' of logic is being used). |
22329 | Logic is highly general truths abstracted from reality [Russell, by Glock] |
Full Idea: In 1911 Russell held that the propositions of logic are supremely general truths about the most pervasive traits of reality, to which we have access by abstraction from non-logical propositions. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Philosophical Implications of Mathematical logic [1911]) by Hans-Johann Glock - What is Analytic Philosophy? 2.4 | |
A reaction: Glock says the rival views were Mill's inductions, psychologism, and Frege's platonism. Wittgenstein converted Russell to a fifth view, that logic is empty tautologies. I remain resolutely attached to Russell's abstraction view. |
12444 | Logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology [Russell] |
Full Idea: Logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology, though with its more abstract and general features. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVI) | |
A reaction: I love this idea and am very sympathetic to it. The rival view seems to be that logic is purely conventional, perhaps defined by truth tables etc. It is hard to see how a connective like 'tonk' could be self-evidently silly if it wasn't 'unnatural'. |
10053 | Geometrical axioms imply the propositions, but the former may not be true [Russell] |
Full Idea: We must only assert of various geometries that the axioms imply the propositions, not that the axioms are true and therefore that the propositions are true. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Foundations of Geometry [1897], Intro vii), quoted by Alan Musgrave - Logicism Revisited §4 | |
A reaction: Clearly the truth of the axioms can remain a separate issue from whether they actually imply the theorems. The truth of the axioms might be as much a metaphysical as an empirical question. Musgrave sees this as the birth of if-thenism. |
21539 | Excluded middle can be stated psychologically, as denial of p implies assertion of not-p [Russell] |
Full Idea: The law of excluded middle may be stated in the form: If p is denied, not-p must be asserted; this form is too psychological to be ultimate, but the point is that it is significant and not a mere tautology. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.41) | |
A reaction: 'Psychology' is, of course, taboo, post-Frege, though I think it is interesting. Stated in this form the law looks more false than usual. I can be quite clear than p is unacceptable, but unclear about its contrary. |
18944 | Russell's theories aim to preserve excluded middle (saying all sentences are T or F) [Sawyer on Russell] |
Full Idea: Russell's account of names and definite descriptions was concerned to preserve the law of excluded middle, according to which every sentence is either true or false (but it is not obvious that the law ought to be preserved). | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 3 | |
A reaction: That is the strongest form of excluded middle, but things work better if every sentence is either 'true' or 'not true', leaving it open whether 'not true' actually means 'false'. |
2947 | Questions wouldn't lead anywhere without the law of excluded middle [Russell] |
Full Idea: Without the law of excluded middle, we could not ask the questions that give rise to discoveries. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], c.p.88) |
7758 | 'Elizabeth = Queen of England' is really a predication, not an identity-statement [Russell, by Lycan] |
Full Idea: On Russell's view 'Elizabeth II = Queen of England' is only superficially an identity-statement; really it is a predication, and attributes a complex relational property to Elizabeth. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language Ch.1 | |
A reaction: The original example is 'Scott = author of Waverley'. Why can't such statements be identities, in which the reference of one half of the identity is not yet known? 'The murderer is violent' and 'Smith is violent' suggests 'Smith is the murderer'. |
6092 | In a logically perfect language, there will be just one word for every simple object [Russell] |
Full Idea: In a logically perfect language, there will be one word and no more for every simple object. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §II) | |
A reaction: In other words, there would be no universals, only names? All that matters is that a language can successfully refer (unambiguously) to anything it wishes to. There must be better ways than Russell's lexical explosion. |
6101 | Romulus does not occur in the proposition 'Romulus did not exist' [Russell] |
Full Idea: Romulus does not occur in the proposition 'Romulus did not exist'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §VI) | |
A reaction: A very nice paradoxical assertion, which captures the problem of finding the logical form for negative existential statements. Presumably the proposition refers to the mythical founder of Rome, though. He is not, I suppose, rigidly designated. |
6115 | Vagueness, and simples being beyond experience, are obstacles to a logical language [Russell] |
Full Idea: The fact that we do not experience simples is one obstacle to the actual creation of a correct logical language, and vagueness is another. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.159) | |
A reaction: The dream of creating a perfect logical language looks doomed from the start, but it is a very interesting project to try to pinpoint why it is unlikely to be possible. I say a perfect language cuts nature exactly at the joints, so find the joints. |
7528 | Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions [Russell] |
Full Idea: The metaphysics of Leibniz was explicitly based upon the doctrine that every proposition attributes a predicate to a subject and (what seemed to him almost the same thing) that every fact consists of a substance having a property. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: I think it is realised now that although predicates tend to attribute properties to things, they are far from being the same thing. See Idea 4587, for example. Russell gives us an interesting foot in the door of Leibniz's complex system. |
23476 | Logical constants seem to be entities in propositions, but are actually pure form [Russell] |
Full Idea: 'Logical constants', which might seem to be entities occurring in logical propositions, are really concerned with pure form, and are not actually constituents of the propositions in the verbal expressions of which their names occur. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913], 1.IX) | |
A reaction: This seems to entirely deny the existence of logical constants, and yet he says that they are named. Russell was obviously under pressure here from Wittgenstein. |
23477 | We use logical notions, so they must be objects - but I don't know what they really are [Russell] |
Full Idea: Such words as or, not, all, some, plainly involve logical notions; since we use these intelligently, we must be acquainted with the logical objects involved. But their isolation is difficult, and I do not know what the logical objects really are. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913], 1.IX) | |
A reaction: See Idea 23476, from the previous page. Russell is struggling. Wittgenstein was telling him that the constants are rules (shown in truth tables), rather than objects. |
21586 | The logical connectives are not objects, but are formal, and need a context [Russell] |
Full Idea: Such words as 'or' and 'not' are not names of definite objects, but are words that require a context in order to have a meaning. All of them are formal. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Our Knowledge of the External World [1914], 7) | |
A reaction: [He cites Wittgenstein's 1922 Tractatus in a footnote - presumably in a later edition than 1914] This is the most famous idea which Russell acquired from Wittgenstein. It was yet another step in his scaling down of ontology. |
21597 | Logical connectives have the highest precision, yet are infected by the vagueness of true and false [Russell, by Williamson] |
Full Idea: Russell says the best chance of avoiding vagueness are the logical connectives. ...But the vagueness of 'true' and 'false' infects the logical connectives too. All words are vague. Russell concludes that all language is vague. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Vagueness [1923]) by Timothy Williamson - Vagueness 2.4 | |
A reaction: This relies on the logical connectives being defined semantically, in terms of T and F, but that is standard. Presumably the formal uninterpreted syntax is not vague. |
14105 | There seem to be eight or nine logical constants [Russell] |
Full Idea: The number of logical constants is not great: it appears, in fact, to be eight or nine. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §012) | |
A reaction: There is, of course, lots of scope for interdefinability. No one is going to disagree greatly with his claim, so it is an interesting fact, which invites some sort of (non-platonic) explanation. |
18722 | Negations are not just reversals of truth-value, since that can happen without negation [Wittgenstein on Russell] |
Full Idea: Russell explained ¬p by saying that ¬p is true if p is false and false if p is true. But this is not an explanation of negation, for it might apply to propositions other than the negative. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903]) by Ludwig Wittgenstein - Lectures 1930-32 (student notes) B XI.3 | |
A reaction: Presumably he is thinking of 'the light is on' and 'the light is off'. A very astute criticism, which seems to be correct. What would Russell say? Perhaps we add that negation is an 'operation' which achieves flipping of the truth-value? |
16489 | Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell] |
Full Idea: Imagine a person who knew everything that can be stated without using the word 'not' or some equivalent; would such a person know the whole course of nature, or would he not? | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Human Knowledge: its scope and limits [1948], 9) | |
A reaction: Nowadays we might express Russell's thought as 'Does God need the word 'not'?'. Russell's thesis is that such words concern psychology, and not physics. God would need 'not' to describe how human minds work. |
16479 | 'Or' expresses hesitation, in a dog at a crossroads, or birds risking grabbing crumbs [Russell] |
Full Idea: Psychologically, 'or' corresponds to a state of hesitation. A dog waits at a fork in the road, to see which way you are going. For crumbs on a windowsill, birds behave in a manner we would express by 'shall I be brave, or go hungry?'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: I love two facts here - first, that Russell wants to link the connective to the psychology of experience, and second, that a great logician wants to connect his logic to the minds of animals. |
16481 | 'Or' expresses a mental state, not something about the world [Russell] |
Full Idea: When we assert 'p or q' we are in a state which is derivative from two previous states, and we express this state, not something about the world. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: His example: at a junction this road or that road goes to Oxford, but the world only contains the roads, not some state of 'this or that road'. He doesn't deny that in one sense 'p or q' tells you something about the world. |
16487 | Maybe the 'or' used to describe mental states is not the 'or' of logic [Russell] |
Full Idea: It might be contended that, in describing what happens when a man believes 'p or q', the 'or' that we must use is not the same as the 'or' of logic. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the general verdict on Russell's enquiries in this chapter, but I love any attempt, however lacking in rigour etc., to connect formal logic to how we think, and thence to the world. |
16480 | A disjunction expresses indecision [Russell] |
Full Idea: A disjunction is the verbal expression of indecision, or, if a question, of the desire to reach a decision. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: Russell is fishing here for Grice's conversational implicature. If you want to assert a simple proposition, you don't introduce it into an irrelevant disjunction, because that would have a particular expressive purpose. |
16483 | Disjunction may also arise in practice if there is imperfect memory. [Russell] |
Full Idea: Another situation in which a disjunction may arise is practice is imperfect memory. 'Either Brown or Jones told me that'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) |
14104 | Constants are absolutely definite and unambiguous [Russell] |
Full Idea: A constant is something absolutely definite, concerning which there is no ambiguity whatever. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §006) |
14114 | Variables don't stand alone, but exist as parts of propositional functions [Russell] |
Full Idea: A variable is not any term simply, but any term as entering into a propositional function. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §093) | |
A reaction: So we should think of variables entirely by their role, rather than as having a semantics of their own (pace Kit Fine? - though see Russell §106, p.107). |
5772 | The idea of a variable is fundamental [Russell] |
Full Idea: I take the notion of the variable as fundamental. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905], p.42) | |
A reaction: A key idea of twentieth century philosophy, derived from Frege and handed on to Quine. A universal term, such as 'horse', is a variable, for which any particular horse can be its value. You can calculate using x, and generalise about horses. |
21566 | 'Propositional functions' are ambiguous until the variable is given a value [Russell] |
Full Idea: By a 'propositional function' I mean something which contains a variable x, and expresses a proposition as soon as a value is assigned to x. That is to say, it differs from a proposition solely by the fact that it is ambiguous. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Logical Types [1910], p.216) | |
A reaction: This is Frege's notion of a 'concept', as an assertion of a predicate which still lacks a subject. |
6102 | You can understand 'author of Waverley', but to understand 'Scott' you must know who it applies to [Russell] |
Full Idea: If you understand English you would understand the phrase 'the author of Waverley' if you had not heard it before, whereas you would not understand the meaning of 'Scott', because to know the meaning of a name is to know who it is applied to. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §VI) | |
A reaction: Actually, you would find 'Waverley' a bit baffling too. Would you understand "he was the author of his own destruction"? You can understand "Homer was the author of this" without knowing quite who 'Homer' applies to. All very tricky. |
10423 | There are a set of criteria for pinning down a logically proper name [Russell, by Sainsbury] |
Full Idea: A logically proper name must be semantically simple, have just one referent, be understood by the user, be scopeless, is not a definite description, and rigidly designates. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], 24th pg) by Mark Sainsbury - The Essence of Reference Intro | |
A reaction: Famously, Russell's hopes of achieving this logically desirable end got narrower and narrower, and ended with 'this' or 'that'. Maybe pure language can't do the job. |
14458 | Asking 'Did Homer exist?' is employing an abbreviated description [Russell] |
Full Idea: When we ask whether Homer existed, we are using the word 'Homer' as an abbreviated description. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVI) | |
A reaction: It is hard to disagree with Russell over this rather unusual example. It doesn't seem so plausible when Ottiline refers to 'Bertie'. |
4945 | Russell says names are not denotations, but definite descriptions in disguise [Russell, by Kripke] |
Full Idea: Russell (and Frege) thought that Mill was wrong about names: really a proper name, properly used, simply was a definite description abbreviated or disguised. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Saul A. Kripke - Naming and Necessity lectures Lecture 1 | |
A reaction: It is tempting to oversimplify this issue, one way or the other, but essentially one has to agree with Kripke that naming does not inherently involve description, but is a 'baptism', without initial content. Connotations and descriptions accrue to a name. |
18942 | Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object [Russell, by Sawyer] |
Full Idea: Russell's view of names, understood as a definite description, which is understood as a quantificational phrase, is not to contribute an object to propositions, but to contribute a complex of properties. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 3 | |
A reaction: This seems to contradict the role of constants in first-logic, which are the paradigm names, picking out an object in the domain. Kripke says names and definite descriptions have different modal profiles. |
7745 | Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names? [McCullogh on Russell] |
Full Idea: Russell's proposal that a natural name is an abbreviated description invites four objections: not all speakers can produce descriptions; the description could be false; no one description seems special; and descriptions usually contain names. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Gregory McCullogh - The Game of the Name 8.74 | |
A reaction: The best reply on behalf of Russell is probably to concede all of these points, but deny that any of them are fatal. Most replies will probably say that they are possible true descriptions, rather than actual limited, confused or false ones. |
5386 | Proper names are really descriptions, and can be replaced by a description in a person's mind [Russell] |
Full Idea: Common words, even proper names, are usually really descriptions; that is, the thought in the mind of a person using a proper name correctly can generally only be expressed explicitly if we replace the proper name by a description. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: This is open to challenge, and the modern idea is that they are more like baptisms, but it all comes down to the debate about internal and external content. Russell would appear to be voicing the internalist theory of names. |
7744 | Treat description using quantifiers, and treat proper names as descriptions [Russell, by McCullogh] |
Full Idea: Having proposed that descriptions should be treated in quantificational terms, Russell then went on to introduce the subsidiary injunction that proper names should be treated as descriptions. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918]) by Gregory McCullogh - The Game of the Name 2.18 | |
A reaction: McCulloch says Russell 'has a lot to answer for' here. It became a hot topic with Kripke. Personally I find Lewis's notion of counterparts the most promising line of enquiry. |
10450 | Russell admitted that even names could also be used as descriptions [Russell, by Bach] |
Full Idea: Russell clearly anticipated Donnellan when he said proper names can also be used as descriptions, adding that 'there is nothing in the phraseology to show whether they are being used in this way or as names'. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], p.175) by Kent Bach - What Does It Take to Refer? 22.2 L1 | |
A reaction: This seems also to anticipate Strawson's flexible and pragmatic approach to these things, which I am beginning to think is correct. |
14457 | Names are really descriptions, except for a few words like 'this' and 'that' [Russell] |
Full Idea: We can even say that, in all such knowledge as can be expressed in words, with the exception of 'this' and 'that' and a few other words of which the meaning varies on different occasions - no names occur, but what seem like names are really descriptions. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVI) | |
A reaction: I like the caveat about what is expressed in words. Russell is very good at keeping non-verbal thought in the picture. This is his famous final reduction of names to simple demonstratives. |
18941 | Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions [Russell, by Sawyer] |
Full Idea: Russell proposed that names do not express a Fregean sense, ...but are disguised definite descriptions, of the form 'the F'. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 3 | |
A reaction: Of course, Russell then has a famous theory about definite descriptions, which turns them into quantifications. |
15159 | The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper [Russell, by Soames] |
Full Idea: Russell defined a logically proper name to be one the meaning of which is its referent. However, his internalist epistemology led him to deny that the words we ordinarily call names are logically proper. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Scott Soames - Philosophy of Language 1.25 |
10449 | Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications [Russell, by Bach] |
Full Idea: For Russell, a logically proper name introduces its referent into the proposition, whereas a description introduces a certain quantificational structure, not its denotation. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Kent Bach - What Does It Take to Refer? 22.2 L0 | |
A reaction: I have very strong resistance to the idea that the actual referent could ever become part of a proposition. I am not, and never have been, part of a proposition! Russell depended on narrow 'acquaintance', which meant that few things qualified. |
6410 | The only real proper names are 'this' and 'that'; the rest are really definite descriptions. [Russell, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: Russell argued that the only 'logically proper' names are those which denote particular entities with which one can be acquainted. The best examples are 'this' and 'that'; other apparent names turn out, when analysed, to be definite descriptions. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On the Nature of Acquaintance [1914]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This view is firm countered by the causal theory of reference, proposed by Kripke and others, in which not only people like Aristotle are 'baptised' with a name, but also natural kinds such as water. It is hard to disagree with Kripke on this. |
2612 | Russell rewrote singular term names as predicates [Russell, by Ayer] |
Full Idea: Russell's theory used quantification to eliminate singular terms, which could be meaningful without denoting anything. He reparsed such sentences so they appeared as predicates instead of names. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by A.J. Ayer - The Central Questions of Philosophy IX.A.2 |
7757 | "Nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier [Russell, by Lycan] |
Full Idea: Though someone just beginning to learn English might take it as one, "nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language Ch.1 | |
A reaction: If someone replies to "nobody's there" with "show him to me!", presumably it IS a singular term - just one that doesn't work very well. If you want to get on in life, treat it as a quantifier; if you just want to have fun... |
18943 | Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false [Sawyer on Russell] |
Full Idea: Russell's account implies that all sentences composed of an empty name and a predicate are false, including 'Pegasus was a mythical creature'. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 4 | |
A reaction: Russell insists that such sentences contain a concealed existence claim, which they clearly don't. |
6439 | Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell] |
Full Idea: Unlike descriptions, names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: This interests Russell because of its ontological implications. If we reduce language to names, we can have a pure ontology of 'objects'. We need a system for saying whether a description names something - which is his theory of definite descriptions. |
10426 | A name has got to name something or it is not a name [Russell] |
Full Idea: A name has got to name something or it is not a name. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], 66th pg), quoted by Mark Sainsbury - The Essence of Reference 18.2 | |
A reaction: This seems to be stipulative, since most people would say that a list of potential names for a baby counted as names. It may be wrong. There are fictional names, or mistakes. |
7311 | The only genuine proper names are 'this' and 'that' [Russell] |
Full Idea: In all knowledge that can be expressed in words - with the exception of "this" and "that", and a few other such words - no genuine proper names occur, but what seem like genuine proper names are really descriptions | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVI) | |
A reaction: This is the terminus of Russell's train of thought about descriptions. Suppose you point to something non-existent, like a ghost in a misty churchyard? You'd be back to the original problem of naming a non-existent! |
14455 | 'I met a unicorn' is meaningful, and so is 'unicorn', but 'a unicorn' is not [Russell] |
Full Idea: In 'I met a unicorn' the four words together make a significant proposition, and the word 'unicorn' is significant, …but the two words 'a unicorn' do not form a group having a meaning of its own. It is an indefinite description describing nothing. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVI) |
6411 | Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims [Grayling on Russell] |
Full Idea: The main objections to Russell's theory of descriptions are to say that definite descriptions sometime are referring expressions, and disputing the claim that definite descriptions embody both uniqueness and existence claims. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2 | |
A reaction: The first one seems particularly correct, as you can successfully refer with a false description. See Colin McGinn (Idea 6067) for criticism of the existence claim made by the so-called 'existential' quantifier. |
10433 | Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring [Russell, by Sainsbury] |
Full Idea: Russell's reasons for saying that definite descriptions are not referring expressions are: some definite descriptions have no referent, and they cannot be referring when used in negative existential truths, or in informative identity sentences. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Mark Sainsbury - The Essence of Reference 18.5 | |
A reaction: The idea is that by 'parity of form', if they aren't referring in these situations, they aren't really referring in others. Sainsbury notes that if there are two different forms of definite description (referential and attributive) these arguments fail. |
5385 | The phrase 'a so-and-so' is an 'ambiguous' description'; 'the so-and-so' (singular) is a 'definite' description [Russell] |
Full Idea: A phrase of the form 'a so-and-so' I shall call an 'ambiguous' description, and a phrase of the form 'the so-and-so' (in the singular) I shall call a 'definite' description. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: This leaves the problem of those definite descriptions which succeed in referring ('the present Prime Minister'), those which haven't succeeded yet ('the person who will get the most votes'), and those which won't refer ('the present King of France'). |
1608 | The theory of descriptions eliminates the name of the entity whose existence was presupposed [Russell, by Quine] |
Full Idea: When a statement of being or non-being is analysed by Russell's theory of descriptions it ceases to contain any expression which even purports to name the alleged entity, so the being of such an entity is no longer presupposed. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Willard Quine - On What There Is p.6 |
7754 | Russell's theory explains non-existents, negative existentials, identity problems, and substitutivity [Russell, by Lycan] |
Full Idea: Russell showed that his theory of definite descriptions affords solutions to each of four vexing logical problems: the Problems of Apparent Reference to Non-existents and Negative existentials, Frege's Puzzle about Identity, and Substitutivity. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language 2.Over | |
A reaction: You must seek elsewhere for the explanations of the four problems, but this gives some indication of why Russell's theory was famous, and was felt to be a breakthrough in explaining logical forms. |
21529 | Russell showed how to define 'the', and thereby reduce the ontology of logic [Russell, by Lackey] |
Full Idea: With the devices of the Theory of Descriptions at hand, it was no longer necessary to take 'the' as indefinable, and it was possible to diminish greatly the number of entities to which a logical system is ontologically committed. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Douglas Lackey - Intros to Russell's 'Essays in Analysis' p.13 | |
A reaction: Illuminating, because it shows that ontology is what drove Russell at this time, and really they were all searching for Quine's 'desert landscapes', which minimalise commitment. |
6333 | The theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the concepts of predicate logic [Russell, by Horwich] |
Full Idea: Russell's theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the notions of predicate logic - specifically, 'some', 'every', and 'same as'. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Paul Horwich - Truth (2nd edn) Ch.2.7 | |
A reaction: This helpfully clarifies Russell's project - to find the logical form of every sentence, expressed in terms which are strictly defined and consistent. This huge project now looks rather too optimistic. Artificial Intelligence would love to complete it. |
6412 | Russell implies that 'the baby is crying' is only true if the baby is unique [Grayling on Russell] |
Full Idea: Russell's analysis of 'the baby is crying' seems to imply that this can only be true if there is just one baby in the world; ..to dispose of the objection, it seems necessary to appeal implicitly or explicitly to a 'domain of discourse'. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This objection leads to ordinary language philosophy, and the 'pragmatics' of language. It is standard in modern predicate logic to specify the domain over which an expression is quantified. |
7743 | Russell explained descriptions with quantifiers, where Frege treated them as names [Russell, by McCullogh] |
Full Idea: Russell proposed that descriptions be treated along with the quantifiers, which departs from Frege, who treated descriptions as proper names. ...the problem was that names invoke objects, and there is no object in failed descriptions. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Gregory McCullogh - The Game of the Name 2.16 | |
A reaction: Maybe we just allow intentional objects (such as unicorns) into our ontology? Producing a parsimonious ontology seems to be the main motivation of most philosophy of language. Or maybe names are just not committed to actual existence? |
7310 | Russell avoids non-existent objects by denying that definite descriptions are proper names [Russell, by Miller,A] |
Full Idea: Russell attempted to avoid Meinong's strategy (of saying 'The present King of France' refers to a 'non-existent object') by denying that definite descriptions are proper names. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language 2.7 | |
A reaction: Russell claimed that there was a covert existence claim built into a definite description. What about descriptions in known counterfactual situations ('Queen of the Fairies')? |
12006 | Denying definite description sentences are subject-predicate in form blocks two big problems [Russell, by Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: Since Russell did not want to introduce non-existent objects, or declare many sentences meaningless, he prevented the problem from getting started, by denying that 'the present King of France is bald' is really a subject-predicate sentence. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Graeme Forbes - The Metaphysics of Modality 4.1 |
4569 | Russell says apparent referring expressions are really assertions about properties [Russell, by Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: Russell's theory says that sentences which apparently serve to refer to particulars are really assertions about properties. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by David E. Cooper - Philosophy and the Nature of Language §4.1 | |
A reaction: Right. Which is why particulars get marginalised in Russell, and universals take centre stage. I can't help suspecting that talk of de re/de dicto reference handles this problem better. |
11009 | Russell's theory must be wrong if it says all statements about non-existents are false [Read on Russell] |
Full Idea: Russell's theory makes an exciting distinction between logical and grammatical form, but any theory which says that every positive statement, without distinction, about objects which don't exist is false, has to be wrong. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.5 |
21549 | The theory of descriptions lacks conventions for the scope of quantifiers [Lackey on Russell] |
Full Idea: Some logicians charge that the theory of descriptions as it stands is formally inadequate because it lacks explicit conventions for the scope of quantifiers, and that when these conventions are added the theory becomes unduly complex. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Douglas Lackey - Intros to Russell's 'Essays in Analysis' p.97 | |
A reaction: [Especially in modal contexts, apparently] I suppose if the main point is to spell out the existence commitments of the description, then that has to include quantification, for full generality. |
12796 | Non-count descriptions don't threaten Russell's theory, which is only about singulars [Laycock on Russell] |
Full Idea: It is sometimes claimed that the behaviour of definite non-count descriptions shows Russell's Theory of Descriptions itself to be false. ....but it isn't a general theory of descriptions, but precisely a theory of singular descriptions. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Henry Laycock - Words without Objects 3.1 |
7532 | Denoting is crucial in Russell's account of mathematics, for identifying classes [Russell, by Monk] |
Full Idea: Denoting phrases are central to mathematics, especially in Russell's 'logicist' theory, in which they are crucial to identifying classes ('the class of all mortal beings', 'the class of natural numbers'). | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude Ch.6 | |
A reaction: This explains the motivation for Russell's theory of definite descriptions, since he thinks reference is achieved by description. Russell nearly achieved an extremely complete philosophical system. |
11988 | Russell's analysis means molecular sentences are ambiguous over the scope of the description [Kaplan on Russell] |
Full Idea: Russell's analysis of sentences containing definite descriptions has as an immediate consequence the doctrine that molecular sentences containing definite descriptions are syntactically ambiguous as regards the scope of the definite description. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by David Kaplan - How to Russell a Frege-Church I | |
A reaction: Presumably this is a virtue of Russell's account, and an advert for analytic philosophy, because it reveals an ambiguity which was there all the time. |
14137 | 'Any' is better than 'all' where infinite classes are concerned [Russell] |
Full Idea: The word 'any' is preferable to the word 'all' where infinite classes are concerned. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §284) | |
A reaction: The reason must be that it is hard to quantify over 'all' of the infinite members, but it is easier to say what is true of any one of them. |
6061 | Existence is entirely expressed by the existential quantifier [Russell, by McGinn] |
Full Idea: Nowadays Russell's position is routinely put by saying that existence is what is expressed by the existential quantifier and only by that. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Colin McGinn - Logical Properties Ch.2 | |
A reaction: We must keep separate how you express existence, and what it is. Quantifiers seem only to be a style of expressing existence; they don't offer any insight into what existence actually is, or what we mean by 'exist'. McGinn dislikes quantifiers. |
18273 | Logical truths are known by their extreme generality [Russell] |
Full Idea: A touchstone by which logical propositions may be distinguished from all others is that they result from a process of generalisation which has been carried to its utmost limits. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913], p.129), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 7 'What' |
17629 | Which premises are ultimate varies with context [Russell] |
Full Idea: Premises which are ultimate in one investigation may cease to be so in another. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Regressive Method for Premises in Mathematics [1907], p.273) |
17630 | The sources of a proof are the reasons why we believe its conclusion [Russell] |
Full Idea: In mathematics, except in the earliest parts, the propositions from which a given proposition is deduced generally give the reason why we believe the given proposition. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Regressive Method for Premises in Mathematics [1907], p.273) |
17640 | Finding the axioms may be the only route to some new results [Russell] |
Full Idea: The premises [of a science] ...are pretty certain to lead to a number of new results which could not otherwise have been known. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Regressive Method for Premises in Mathematics [1907], p.282) | |
A reaction: I identify this as the 'fruitfulness' that results when the essence of something is discovered. |
6109 | Some axioms may only become accepted when they lead to obvious conclusions [Russell] |
Full Idea: Some of the premisses (of my logicist theory) are much less obvious than some of their consequences, and are believed chiefly because of their consequences. This will be found to be always the case when a science is arranged as a deductive system. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.145) | |
A reaction: We shouldn't assume the model of self-evident axioms leading to surprising conclusions, which is something like the standard model for rationalist foundationalists. Russell nicely points out that the situation could be just the opposite |
7557 | To solve Zeno's paradox, reject the axiom that the whole has more terms than the parts [Russell] |
Full Idea: Presumably Zeno appealed to the axiom that the whole has more terms than the parts; so if Achilles were to overtake the tortoise, he would have been in more places than the tortoise, which he can't be; but the conclusion is absurd, so reject the axiom. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Mathematics and the Metaphysicians [1901], p.89) | |
A reaction: The point is that the axiom is normally acceptable (a statue contains more particles than the arm of the statue), but it breaks down when discussing infinity (Idea 7556). Modern theories of infinity are needed to solve Zeno's Paradoxes. |
14149 | The Achilles Paradox concerns the one-one correlation of infinite classes [Russell] |
Full Idea: When the Achilles Paradox is translated into arithmetical language, it is seen to be concerned with the one-one correlation of two infinite classes. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §321) | |
A reaction: Dedekind's view of infinity (Idea 9826) shows why this results in a horrible tangle. |
21585 | The tortoise won't win, because infinite instants don't compose an infinitely long time [Russell] |
Full Idea: The idea that an infinite number of instants make up an infinitely long time is not true, and therefore the conclusion that Achilles will never overtake the tortoise does not follow. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Our Knowledge of the External World [1914], 6) | |
A reaction: Aristotle spotted this, but didn't express it as clearly as Russell. |
21565 | Richard's puzzle uses the notion of 'definition' - but that cannot be defined [Russell] |
Full Idea: In Richard's puzzle, we use the notion of 'definition', and this, oddly enough, is not definable, and is indeed not a definite notion at all. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On 'Insolubilia' and their solution [1906], p.209) | |
A reaction: The background for this claim is his type theory, which renders certain forms of circular reference meaningless. |
15895 | Russell discovered the paradox suggested by Burali-Forti's work [Russell, by Lavine] |
Full Idea: Burali-Forti didn't discover any paradoxes, though his work suggested a paradox to Russell. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903]) by Shaughan Lavine - Understanding the Infinite I |
13365 | Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox [Priest,G on Russell] |
Full Idea: Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (Letters to Frege [1902]) by Graham Priest - The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference §2 |
10711 | Russell's paradox means we cannot assume that every property is collectivizing [Potter on Russell] |
Full Idea: Russell's paradox showed that we cannot consistently assume what is sometimes called the 'naïve comprehension principle', namely that every property is collectivizing. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (Letters to Frege [1902]) by Michael Potter - Set Theory and Its Philosophy 03.6 |
6407 | The class of classes which lack self-membership leads to a contradiction [Russell, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: The class of teaspoons isn't a teaspoon, so isn't a member of itself; but the class of non-teaspoons is a member of itself. The class of all classes which are not members of themselves is a member of itself if it isn't a member of itself! Paradox. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Mathematical logic and theory of types [1908]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2 | |
A reaction: A very compressed version of Russell's famous paradox, often known as the 'barber' paradox. Russell developed his Theory of Types in an attempt to counter the paradox. Frege's response was to despair of his own theory. |
21564 | Vicious Circle: what involves ALL must not be one of those ALL [Russell] |
Full Idea: The 'vicious-circle principle' says 'whatever involves an apparent variable must not be among the possible values of that variable', or (less exactly) 'whatever involves ALL must not be one of ALL which it involves. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On 'Insolubilia' and their solution [1906], p.204) | |
A reaction: He offers this as a parallel to his 'no classes' principle. That referred to classes, but this refers to propositions, and specifically the Liar Paradox (which he calls the 'Epimenedes'). |
21567 | 'All judgements made by Epimenedes are true' needs the judgements to be of the same type [Russell] |
Full Idea: Such a proposition as 'all the judgements made by Epimenedes are true' will only be prima facie capable of truth if all his judgements are of the same order. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Logical Types [1910], p.227) | |
A reaction: This is an attempt to use his theory of types to solve the Liar. Tarski's invocation of a meta-language is clearly in the same territory. |
16475 | A 'heterological' predicate can't be predicated of itself; so is 'heterological' heterological? Yes=no! [Russell] |
Full Idea: A predicate is 'heterological' when it cannot be predicated of itself; thus 'long' is heterological because it is not a long word, but 'short' is homological. So is 'heterological' heterological? Either answer leads to a contradiction. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: [Grelling's Paradox] Yes: 'heterological' is heterological because it isn't heterological; No: it isn't, because it is. Russell says we therefore need a hierarchy of languages (types), and the word 'word' is outside the system. |