display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
4 ideas
3084 | Our underlying predicates represent words in the language, not universal concepts [Harman] |
Full Idea: The underlying truth-conditional structures of thoughts are language-dependent in the sense that underlying predicates represent words in the language rather than universal concepts common to all languages. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 6.3) |
3080 | Logical form is the part of a sentence structure which involves logical elements [Harman] |
Full Idea: The logical form of a sentence is that part of its structure that involves logical elements. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 5.2) |
3081 | A theory of truth in a language must involve a theory of logical form [Harman] |
Full Idea: Some sort of theory of logical form is involved in any theory of truth for a natural language. | |
From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 5.2) |
12597 | I might accept P and Q as likely, but reject P-and-Q as unlikely [Harman] |
Full Idea: Principles of implication imply there is not a purely probabilistic rule of acceptance for belief. Otherwise one might accept P and Q, without accepting their conjunction, if the conjuncts have a high probability, but the conjunction doesn't. | |
From: Gilbert Harman ((Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics [1987], 12.2.2) | |
A reaction: [Idea from Scott Soames] I am told that my friend A has just won a very big lottery prize, and am then told that my friend B has also won a very big lottery prize. The conjunction seems less believable; I begin to suspect a conspiracy. |