display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
10 ideas
| 10437 | Names are rigid, making them unlike definite descriptions [Kripke, by Sainsbury] |
| Full Idea: It was important to Kripke to contrast the rigidity of names with the non-rigidity of many or most definite descriptions. | |
| From: report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970]) by Mark Sainsbury - The Essence of Reference 18.6 | |
| A reaction: Philosophers always want sharp distinctions, but there are tricky names like 'Homer' and 'Jack the Ripper' where the name is stable, but its referent wobbles. |
| 4949 | Names are rigid designators, which designate the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke] |
| Full Idea: I will call something a 'rigid designator' if in every possible world it designates the same object, ..and I will maintain the intuitive thesis that names are rigid designators. | |
| From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 1) | |
| A reaction: The immediate problem seems to be objects that change across possible worlds. Did nature rigidly designate Aristotle (e.g. by his DNA)? Could Aristotle have been shorter, female, cleverer, his own twin? Is the River Thames rigid? |
| 4951 | A bundle of qualities is a collection of abstractions, so it can't be a particular [Kripke] |
| Full Idea: I deny that a particular is nothing but a 'bundle of qualities', whatever that may mean. If a quality is an abstract object, a bundle of qualities is an object of an even higher degree of abstraction, not a particular. | |
| From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 1) | |
| A reaction: Supports the 'baptism' view of reference, rather than Searle's bundle of descriptions. It shows that theories of reference must tie in with theories of universals, and that Searle is a nominalist. Is Kripke trying to duck metaphysical responsibility? |
| 17031 | A name can still refer even if it satisfies none of its well-known descriptions [Kripke] |
| Full Idea: Suppose the vote yields no object, that nothing satisfies most, or even any, substantial number, of the φ's. Does that mean the name doesn't refer? No. | |
| From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 2) | |
| A reaction: As example he gives the case of 'Gödel' referring to the famous man, even if none of the descriptions of him are true. In Note 42 he blames the descriptivists for relying too much on famous people. |
| 9175 | We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid [Kripke] |
| Full Idea: We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by use of some descriptive phrase, such as 'author of these works'. But once we have this reference fixed, we then use the name 'Cicero' rigidly to designate the man who in fact we have identified by his authorship. | |
| From: Saul A. Kripke (Identity and Necessity [1971], p.183) | |
| A reaction: Even supposedly rigid names can shift reference, as Evans's example of 'Madagascar' shows (Idea 9041). Reference is a much more social activity than Kripke is willing to admit. There is a 'tradition' of reference (Dummett) for the name 'Cicero'. |
| 8957 | Some references, such as 'Neptune', have to be fixed by description rather than baptism [Kripke, by Szabó] |
| Full Idea: Kripke explicitly allows for the introduction of names through initial reference-fixing via descriptions. Versions of the causal theory of reference that disallow this would have a difficult time explaining how the name 'Neptune' came to refer. | |
| From: report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970]) by Zoltán Gendler Szabó - Nominalism 4.2 n35 | |
| A reaction: The initial reference to Neptune has to be by description, but you could still give a baptismal account once it is discovered. The direct contact now takes precedence. Suppose another similar planet was found nearby... |
| 9171 | The function of names is simply to refer [Kripke] |
| Full Idea: The function of names is simply to refer. | |
| From: Saul A. Kripke (Identity and Necessity [1971], p.167) | |
| A reaction: This is Kripke reverting to the John Stuart Mill view of names. If I say "you are a right Casanova" I don't simply refer to Casanova. In notorious examples like 'Homer' reference is fine, but the object of reference is a bit elusive. |
| 10428 | Proper names must have referents, because they are not descriptive [Kripke, by Sainsbury] |
| Full Idea: A common source of the view that proper names must have referents is that they are not descriptive (as expressed by Kripke). | |
| From: report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970]) by Mark Sainsbury - The Essence of Reference 18.2 | |
| A reaction: Sainsbury observes that there might be some other way for a name to be intelligible, with describing or referring. |
| 4959 | A name's reference is not fixed by any marks or properties of the referent [Kripke] |
| Full Idea: It is in general not the case that the reference of a name is determined by some uniquely identifying marks, some unique properties satisfied by the referent and known or believed to be true of that referent by the speaker. | |
| From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 3) | |
| A reaction: He is proposing, instead, his historical/causal theory. There does seem to be a problem with objects which have a historical 'baptism', and then entirely change their properties. Kripke us desperate for a simple account of reference. |
| 16982 | A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same! [Kripke] |
| Full Idea: Two totally distinct 'historical chains' that be sheer accident assign the same name to the same man should probably count as creating distinct names despite the identity of the referents. | |
| From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.08 n9) | |
| A reaction: A nice puzzle for his own theory. 'What's you name?' 'Alice, and Alice!' |