Combining Philosophers

Ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Richard Wollheim and Ian Rumfitt

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2 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
When faced with vague statements, Bivalence is not a compelling principle [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: I do not regard Bivalence, when applied to vague statements, as an intuitively compelling principle which we ought to try to preserve.
     From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 8.7)
     A reaction: The point of Rumfitt's book is to defend classical logic despite failures of bivalence. He also cites undecidable concepts such as the Continuum Hypothesis.
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction
Contradictions include 'This is red and not coloured', as well as the formal 'B and not-B' [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: Overt contradictions include formal contradictions of form 'B and not B', but I also take them to include 'This is red all over and green all over' and 'This is red and not coloured'.
     From: Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010], Intro)