Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Hermarchus, Gareth Evans and Demetris Portides

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans]
     Full Idea: There are two related but distinguishable questions concerning proper names: what the speaker denotes (upon an occasion), and what the name denotes.
     From: Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §I)
     A reaction: I don't think any account of language makes sense without this sort of distinction, as in my favourite example: the password is 'swordfish'. So how does language gets its own meanings, independent of what speakers intend?
How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans]
     Full Idea: We need an account of what makes an expression into a name for something that will allow names to change their denotations.
     From: Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §II)
     A reaction: Presumably an example would be 'The Prime Minister is in the building'. Evans proposes to discuss communication, rather than strict meanings and descriptions.
A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans]
     Full Idea: Intentions alone don't bring it about that a name gets a denotation; without the intention being manifest there cannot be the common knowledge required for the practice.
     From: Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §II)
     A reaction: Well, I might have a private name for some hated colleague which I mutter to myself whenever I see her. The way names, and language generally, becomes ossified is by joining the great impersonal sea of the language. ..waves of bones,
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans]
     Full Idea: Change of denotation is decisive against the Causal Theory of Names. Changes of denotation actually occur: a hearsay report misunderstood by Marco Polo transferred the name 'Madagascar' from a portion of the mainland to the African island.
     From: Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §I)
     A reaction: This doesn't sound decisive, as you could give an intermediate causal account of Marco Polo's mistake. I might take the famous name Winston, and baptise my son with it. And I might have done it because I thought Winston was a German dictator.