display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
9 ideas
23502 | Logic fills the world, to its limits [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 5.61) | |
A reaction: This is a gospel belief for hardcore analytic philosophy. Hence Williamson writes a book on modal logic as metaphysics. |
18724 | In logic nothing is hidden [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: In logic nothing is hidden. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Lectures 1930-32 (student notes) [1931], B XII.3) | |
A reaction: If so, then the essence of logic must be there for all to see. The rules of natural deduction are a good shot at showing this. |
16908 | We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: The 'self-evidence' of which Russell talks so much can only be dispensed with in logic if language itself prevents any logical mistake. | |
From: comment on Ludwig Wittgenstein (Notebooks 1914-1916 [1915], 4) by Robin Jeshion - Frege's Notion of Self-Evidence 4 | |
A reaction: Jeshion presents this as a key idea, turning against Frege, and is the real source of the 'linguistic turn' in philosophy. If self-evidence is abandoned, then language itself is the guide to truth, so study language. I think I prefer Frege. See Quine? |
23504 | Logic concerns everything that is subject to law; the rest is accident [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: The exploration of logic means the exploration of everything that is subject to law. And outside logic everything is accidental. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 6.3) | |
A reaction: Why should laws be logical? Legislatures can pass whimsical laws. Does he mean that the laws of nature are logically necessary? He can't just mean logical laws. |
17786 | The mainstream of modern logic sees it as a branch of mathematics [Mayberry] |
Full Idea: In the mainstream tradition of modern logic, beginning with Boole, Peirce and Schröder, descending through Löwenheim and Skolem to reach maturity with Tarski and his school ...saw logic as a branch of mathematics. | |
From: John Mayberry (What Required for Foundation for Maths? [1994], p.410-1) | |
A reaction: [The lesser tradition, of Frege and Russell, says mathematics is a branch of logic]. Mayberry says the Fregean tradition 'has almost died out'. |
6428 | Wittgenstein is right that logic is just tautologies [Wittgenstein, by Russell] |
Full Idea: I think Wittgenstein is right when he says (in the 'Tractatus') that logic consists wholly of tautologies. | |
From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921]) by Bertrand Russell - My Philosophical Development Ch.10 | |
A reaction: Despite Russell's support, I find this hard to accept. While a 'pure' or 'Platonist' logic may be hard to demonstrate or believe, I have a strong gut feeling that logic is more of a natural phenomenon than a human convention. |
11062 | Logic is a priori because it is impossible to think illogically [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: What makes logic a priori is the impossibility of illogical thought. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 5.4731) | |
A reaction: That places the a priori aspect of it in us (in the epistemology), rather than in the necessity of the logic (the ontology), which is as Kripke says it should be. |
17788 | First-order logic only has its main theorems because it is so weak [Mayberry] |
Full Idea: First-order logic is very weak, but therein lies its strength. Its principle tools (Compactness, Completeness, Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems) can be established only because it is too weak to axiomatize either arithmetic or analysis. | |
From: John Mayberry (What Required for Foundation for Maths? [1994], p.411-2) | |
A reaction: He adds the proviso that this is 'unless we are dealing with structures on whose size we have placed an explicit, finite bound' (p.412-1). |
17791 | Only second-order logic can capture mathematical structure up to isomorphism [Mayberry] |
Full Idea: Second-order logic is a powerful tool of definition: by means of it alone we can capture mathematical structure up to isomorphism using simple axiom systems. | |
From: John Mayberry (What Required for Foundation for Maths? [1994], p.412-1) |