Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Hermarchus, Paul Horwich and William W. Tait

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2 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Logical form is the aspects of meaning that determine logical entailments [Horwich]
     Full Idea: The logical forms of the sentences in a language are those aspects of their meanings that determine the relations of deductive entailment holding amongst them.
     From: Paul Horwich (Truth (2nd edn) [1990], Ch.6.30)
     A reaction: A helpful definition. Not all sentences, therefore, need to have a 'logical form'. Is the logical form the same as the underlying proposition. The two must converge, given that propositions lack the ambiguity that is often found in sentences.
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
Mathematics must be based on axioms, which are true because they are axioms, not vice versa [Tait, by Parsons,C]
     Full Idea: The axiomatic conception of mathematics is the only viable one. ...But they are true because they are axioms, in contrast to the view advanced by Frege (to Hilbert) that to be a candidate for axiomhood a statement must be true.
     From: report of William W. Tait (Intro to 'Provenance of Pure Reason' [2005], p.4) by Charles Parsons - Review of Tait 'Provenance of Pure Reason' §2
     A reaction: This looks like the classic twentieth century shift in the attitude to axioms. The Greek idea is that they must be self-evident truths, but the Tait-style view is that they are just the first steps in establishing a logical structure. I prefer the Greeks.