Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Hermarchus, Peter Simons and Alex Orenstein

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names

12876	Philosophy is stuck on the Fregean view that an individual is anything with a proper name [Simons]
	Full Idea: Modern philosophy is still under the spell of Frege's view that an individual is anything that has a proper name. (Note: But not only are empty names now recognised, but some are aware of the existence of plural reference).
	From: Peter Simons (Parts [1987], 8.1)
	A reaction: Presumably every electron in the universe is an individual, and every (finite) number which has never been named has a pretty clear identity. Presumably Pegasus, John Doe, and 'the person in the kitchen' have to be accommodated.

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification

8452	Traditionally, universal sentences had existential import, but were later treated as conditional claims [Orenstein]
	Full Idea: In traditional logic from Aristotle to Kant, universal sentences have existential import, but Brentano and Boole construed them as universal conditionals (such as 'for anything, if it is a man, then it is mortal').
	From: Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.2)
	A reaction: I am sympathetic to the idea that even the 'existential' quantifier should be treated as conditional, or fictional. Modern Christians may well routinely quantify over angels, without actually being committed to them.

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification

8475	The substitution view of quantification says a sentence is true when there is a substitution instance [Orenstein]
	Full Idea: The substitution view of quantification explains 'there-is-an-x-such-that x is a man' as true when it has a true substitution instance, as in the case of 'Socrates is a man', so the quantifier can be read as 'it is sometimes true that'.
	From: Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.5)
	A reaction: The word 'true' crops up twice here. The alternative (existential-referential) view cites objects, so the substitution view is a more linguistic approach.

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification

12845	Some natural languages don't distinguish between singular and plural [Simons]
	Full Idea: The syntactic distinction between singular and plural is not a universal feature of natural languages. Chinese manages nicely without it, and Sanskrit makes a tripartite distinction between singular, dual, and plural (more than two).
	From: Peter Simons (Parts [1987], 4.3)
	A reaction: Simons is mounting an attack on the way in which modern philosophy and logic has been mesmerised by singular terms and individuated objects. Most people seem now to agree with Simons. There is stuff, as well as plurals.