Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Jeremiah, Keith Hossack and Bas C. van Fraassen

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7 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
The connective 'and' can have an order-sensitive meaning, as 'and then' [Hossack]
     Full Idea: The sentence connective 'and' also has an order-sensitive meaning, when it means something like 'and then'.
     From: Keith Hossack (Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number [2020], 10.4)
     A reaction: This is support the idea that orders are a feature of reality, just as much as possible concatenation. Relational predicates, he says, refer to series rather than to individuals. Nice point.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
'Before' and 'after' are not two relations, but one relation with two orders [Hossack]
     Full Idea: The reason the two predicates 'before' and 'after' are needed is not to express different relations, but to indicate its order. Since there can be difference of order without difference of relation, the nature of relations is not the source of order.
     From: Keith Hossack (Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number [2020], 10.3)
     A reaction: This point is to refute Russell's 1903 claim that order arises from the nature of relations. Hossack claims that it is ordered series which are basic. I'm inclined to agree with him.
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
Plural definite descriptions pick out the largest class of things that fit the description [Hossack]
     Full Idea: If we extend the power of language with plural definite descriptions, these would pick out the largest class of things that fit the description.
     From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 3)
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Plural reference will refer to complex facts without postulating complex things [Hossack]
     Full Idea: It may be that plural reference gives atomism the resources to state complex facts without needing to refer to complex things.
     From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 1)
     A reaction: This seems the most interesting metaphysical implication of the possibility of plural quantification.
Plural reference is just an abbreviation when properties are distributive, but not otherwise [Hossack]
     Full Idea: If all properties are distributive, plural reference is just a handy abbreviation to avoid repetition (as in 'A and B are hungry', to avoid 'A is hungry and B is hungry'), but not all properties are distributive (as in 'some people surround a table').
     From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 2)
     A reaction: The characteristic examples to support plural quantification involve collective activity and relations, which might be weeded out of our basic ontology, thus leaving singular quantification as sufficient.
A plural comprehension principle says there are some things one of which meets some condition [Hossack]
     Full Idea: Singular comprehension principles have a bad reputation, but the plural comprehension principle says that given a condition on individuals, there are some things such that something is one of them iff it meets the condition.
     From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 4)
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
Plural language can discuss without inconsistency things that are not members of themselves [Hossack]
     Full Idea: In a plural language we can discuss without fear of inconsistency the things that are not members of themselves.
     From: Keith Hossack (Plurals and Complexes [2000], 4)
     A reaction: [see Hossack for details]