Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Johann Fichte, J Pollock / J Cruz and Gilbert Harman

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5 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form

3084	Our underlying predicates represent words in the language, not universal concepts [Harman]
	Full Idea: The underlying truth-conditional structures of thoughts are language-dependent in the sense that underlying predicates represent words in the language rather than universal concepts common to all languages.
	From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 6.3)

3080	Logical form is the part of a sentence structure which involves logical elements [Harman]
	Full Idea: The logical form of a sentence is that part of its structure that involves logical elements.
	From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 5.2)

3081	A theory of truth in a language must involve a theory of logical form [Harman]
	Full Idea: Some sort of theory of logical form is involved in any theory of truth for a natural language.
	From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 5.2)

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not

22017	Normativity needs the possibility of negation, in affirmation and denial [Fichte, by Pinkard]
	Full Idea: To adopt any kind of normative stance is to commit oneself necessarily to the possibility of negation. It involves doing something correctly or incorrectly, so there must exist the possibility of denying or affirming.
	From: report of Johann Fichte (The Science of Knowing (Wissenschaftslehre) [1st ed] [1794]) by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 05
	A reaction: This seems to be the key idea for understanding Hegel's logic. Personally I think animals have a non-verbal experience of negation - when a partner dies, for example.

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and

12597	I might accept P and Q as likely, but reject P-and-Q as unlikely [Harman]
	Full Idea: Principles of implication imply there is not a purely probabilistic rule of acceptance for belief. Otherwise one might accept P and Q, without accepting their conjunction, if the conjuncts have a high probability, but the conjunction doesn't.
	From: Gilbert Harman ((Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics [1987], 12.2.2)
	A reaction: [Idea from Scott Soames] I am told that my friend A has just won a very big lottery prize, and am then told that my friend B has also won a very big lottery prize. The conjunction seems less believable; I begin to suspect a conspiracy.