Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, C.I. Lewis and Philip Kitcher

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5 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic

9358	There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth [Lewis,CI]
	Full Idea: The fact is that there are several logics, markedly different, each self-consistent in its own terms and such that whoever, using it, avoids false premises, will never reach a false conclusion.
	From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.366)
	A reaction: As the man who invented modal logic in five different versions, he speaks with some authority. Logicians now debate which version is the best, so how could that be decided? You could avoid false conclusions by never reasoning at all.

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic

12430	Classical logic is our preconditions for assessing empirical evidence [Kitcher]
	Full Idea: In my terminology, classical logic (or at least, its most central tenets) consists of propositional preconditions for our assessing empirical evidence in the way we do.
	From: Philip Kitcher (A Priori Knowledge Revisited [2000], §VII)
	A reaction: I like an even stronger version of this - that classical logic arises out of our experiences of things, and so we are just assessing empirical evidence in terms of other (generalised) empirical evidence. Logic results from induction. Very unfashionable.

12431	I believe classical logic because I was taught it and use it, but it could be undermined [Kitcher]
	Full Idea: I believe the laws of classical logic, in part because I was taught them, and in part because I think I see how those laws are used in assessing evidence. But my belief could easily be undermined by experience.
	From: Philip Kitcher (A Priori Knowledge Revisited [2000], §VII)
	A reaction: Quine has one genuine follower! The trouble is his first sentence would fit witch-doctoring just as well. Kitcher went to Cambridge; I hope he doesn't just believe things because he was taught them, or because he 'sees how they are used'!

5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle

9357	Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience [Lewis,CI]
	Full Idea: The law of excluded middle formulates our decision that whatever is not designated by a certain term shall be designated by its negative. It declares our purpose to make a complete dichotomy of experience, ..which is only our penchant for simplicity.
	From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.365)
	A reaction: I find this view quite appealing. 'Look, it's either F or it isn't!' is a dogmatic attitude which irritates a lot of people, and appears to be dispensible. Intuitionists in mathematics dispense with the principle, and vagueness threatens it.

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names

9364	Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing [Lewis,CI]
	Full Idea: A name must represent some uniformity in experience or it names nothing.
	From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.368)
	A reaction: I like this because, in the quintessentially linguistic debate about the exact logical role of names, it reminds us that names arise because of the way reality is; they are not sui generis private games for logicians.