Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Damon and David Bostock

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3 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
Interpretation by assigning objects to names, or assigning them to variables first [Bostock, by PG]
     Full Idea: There are two approaches to an 'interpretation' of a logic: the first method assigns objects to names, and then defines connectives and quantifiers, focusing on truth; the second assigns objects to variables, then variables to names, using satisfaction.
     From: report of David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 3.4) by PG - Db (lexicon)
     A reaction: [a summary of nine elusive pages in Bostock] He says he prefers the first method, but the second method is more popular because it handles open formulas, by treating free variables as if they were names.
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 5. Extensionalism
Extensionality is built into ordinary logic semantics; names have objects, predicates have sets of objects [Bostock]
     Full Idea: Extensionality is built into the semantics of ordinary logic. When a name-letter is interpreted as denoting something, we just provide the object denoted. All that we provide for a one-place predicate-letter is the set of objects that it is true of..
     From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997])
     A reaction: Could we keep the syntax of ordinary logic, and provide a wildly different semantics, much closer to real life? We could give up these dreadful 'objects' that Frege lumbered us with. Logic for processes, etc.
If an object has two names, truth is undisturbed if the names are swapped; this is Extensionality [Bostock]
     Full Idea: If two names refer to the same object, then in any proposition which contains either of them the other may be substituted in its place, and the truth-value of the proposition of the proposition will be unaltered. This is the Principle of Extensionality.
     From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 3.1)
     A reaction: He acknowledges that ordinary language is full of counterexamples, such as 'he doesn't know the Morning Star and the Evening Star are the same body' (when he presumably knows that the Morning Star is the Morning Star). This is logic. Like maths.