12219
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Whether a modal claim is true depends on how the object is described [Quine, by Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
Quine says if ∃x□(x>7) makes sense, then for which object x is the condition rendered true? Specify it as '9' and it is apparently rendered true, specify it as 'the number of planets' and it is apparently rendered false.
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From:
report of Willard Quine (Three Grades of Modal Involvement [1953]) by Kit Fine - Quine on Quantifying In p.105
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A reaction:
This is normally characterised as Quine saying that only de dicto involvement is possible, and not de re involvement. Or that that all essences are nominal, and cannot be real.
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22437
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Logical languages are rooted in ordinary language, and that connection must be kept [Quine]
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Full Idea:
A logical language is not independent of ordinary language. It has its roots in ordinary language, and these roots are not to be severed.
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From:
Willard Quine (Mr Strawson on Logical Theory [1953], V)
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A reaction:
Music to my ears. When you study logic, no one has to teach you what the words 'or' and 'if-then' mean, but they are disambiguated by the symbolism. The roots of logic are in ordinary talk of 'and', 'or' and 'not', which is the real world.
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20296
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Logic needs general conventions, but that needs logic to apply them to individual cases [Quine, by Rey]
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Full Idea:
Quine argues that logic could not be established by conventions, since the logical truths, being infinite in number, must be given by general conventions rather than singly; and logic is needed in the meta-theory, to apply to individual cases.
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From:
report of Willard Quine (Truth by Convention [1935]) by Georges Rey - The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction 3.4
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A reaction:
A helpful insight into Quine's claim. If only someone would print these one sentence summaries at the top of classic papers, we would all get far more out of them at first reading. Assuming Rey is right!
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8998
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Claims that logic and mathematics are conventional are either empty, uninteresting, or false [Quine]
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Full Idea:
If logic and mathematics being true by convention says the primitives can be conventionally described, that works for anything, and is empty; if the conventions are only for those fields, that's uninteresting; if a general practice, that is false.
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From:
Willard Quine (Truth by Convention [1935], p.102)
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A reaction:
This is Quine's famous denial of the traditional platonist view, and the new Wittgensteinian conventional view, preparing the ground for a more naturalistic and empirical view. I feel more sympathy with Quine than with the other two.
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