Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Georg Kreisel and Frank P. Ramsey

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these philosophers

display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers


1 idea

5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
Either 'a = b' vacuously names the same thing, or absurdly names different things [Ramsey]
     Full Idea: In 'a = b' either 'a' and 'b' are names of the same thing, in which case the proposition says nothing, or of different things, in which case it is absurd. In neither case is it an assertion of a fact; it only asserts when a or b are descriptions.
     From: Frank P. Ramsey (The Foundations of Mathematics [1925], §1)
     A reaction: This is essentially Frege's problem with Hesperus and Phosphorus. How can identities be informative? So 2+2=4 is extensionally vacuous, but informative because they are different descriptions.