display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
10 ideas
18954 | Before the late 19th century logic was trivialised by not dealing with relations [Putnam] |
Full Idea: It was essentially the failure to develop a logic of relations that trivialised the logic studied before the end of the nineteenth century. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Logic [1971], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: De Morgan, Peirce and Frege were, I believe, the people who put this right. |
18956 | Asserting first-order validity implicitly involves second-order reference to classes [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The natural understanding of first-order logic is that in writing down first-order schemata we are implicitly asserting their validity, that is, making second-order assertions. ...Thus even quantification theory involves reference to classes. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Logic [1971], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: If, as a nominalist, you totally rejected classes, presumably you would get by in first-order logic somehow. To say 'there are no classes so there is no logical validity' sounds bonkers. |
18962 | Unfashionably, I think logic has an empirical foundation [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Today, the tendency among philosophers is to assume that in no sense does logic itself have an empirical foundation. I believe this tendency is wrong. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Logic [1971], Ch.9) | |
A reaction: I agree, not on the basis of indispensability to science, but on the basis of psychological processes that lead from experience to logic. Russell and Quine are Putnam's allies here, and Frege is his opponent. Putnam developed a quantum logic. |
10066 | Putnam coined the term 'if-thenism' [Putnam, by Musgrave] |
Full Idea: Putnam coined the term 'if-thenism'. | |
From: report of Hilary Putnam (The Thesis that Mathematics is Logic [1967]) by Alan Musgrave - Logicism Revisited §5 n |
18961 | We can identify functions with certain sets - or identify sets with certain functions [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Instead of identifying functions with certain sets, I might have identified sets with certain functions. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Logic [1971], Ch.9) |
17505 | Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The important thing about proper names is that it would be ridiculous to think that having linguistic competence can be equated in their case with knowledge of a necessary and sufficient condition. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Explanation and Reference [1973], II B) |
18955 | Having a valid form doesn't ensure truth, as it may be meaningless [Putnam] |
Full Idea: I don't think all substitution-instances of a valid schema are 'true'; some are clearly meaningless, such as 'If all boojums are snarks and all snarks are egglehumphs, then all boojums are egglehumphs'. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Logic [1971], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: This seems like a very good challenge to Quine's claim that it is only form which produces a logical truth. Keep deductive and semantic consequence separate, with two different types of 'logical truth'. |
14203 | Intension is not meaning, as 'cube' and 'square-faced polyhedron' are intensionally the same [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Intension cannot be identified with meaning. ..'Cube' and 'regular polyhedron with six square faces' are logically equivalent predicates. The intension is the same (the function giving the cubes in any possible world) but there is a difference of meaning. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History [1981], Ch.2) |
14207 | If cats equal cherries, model theory allows reinterpretation of the whole language preserving truth [Putnam] |
Full Idea: If the number of cats happens to equal the cherries, then it follows from the theory of models that there is a reinterpretation of the entire language that leaves all sentences unchanged in truth value while permuting the extensions of 'cat' and 'cherry'. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History [1981], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: This horrifying result seems to come simply from the fact that there is an isomorphism between two models, which in turn seems to rest largely on the cardinality of the models. There seems to be something wrong with model theory here (?). |
9913 | The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem is close to an antinomy in philosophy of language [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem says that a satisfiable first-order theory (in a countable language) has a countable model. ..I argue that this is not a logical antinomy, but close to one in philosophy of language. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Models and Reality [1977], p.421) | |
A reaction: See the rest of this paper for where he takes us on this. |