Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Melvin Fitting, John Dupr and Henry Laycock

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these philosophers

display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers

---

4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics

11026	Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting]
	Full Idea: Mathematics is typically extensional throughout (we write 3+2=2+3 despite the two terms having different meanings). ..Classical first-order logic is extensional by design since it primarily evolved to model the reasoning of mathematics.
	From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], §1)

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic

12797	If plural variables have 'some values', then non-count variables have 'some value' [Laycock]
	Full Idea: If a plural variable is said to have not a single value but some values (some clothes), then a non-count variable may have, more quirkier still, some value (some clothing, for instance) in ranging arbitrarily over the scattered stuff.
	From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], 4.4)
	A reaction: We seem to need the notion of a sample, or an archetype, to fit the bill. I hereby name them 'sample variables'. Damn - Laycock got there first, on p.137.

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction

11028	λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting]
	Full Idea: λ-abstraction can be used to abstract and disambiguate a predicate. De re is [λx◊P(x)](f) - f has the possible-P property - and de dicto is ◊[λxP(x)](f) - possibly f has the P-property. Also applies to □.
	From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], §3.3)
	A reaction: Compare the Barcan formula. Originated with Church in the 1930s, and Carnap 1947, but revived by Stalnaker and Thomason 1968. Because it refers to the predicate, it has a role in intensional versions of logic, especially modal logic.

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification

12794	Plurals are semantical but not ontological [Laycock]
	Full Idea: Plurality is a semantical but not also an ontological construction.
	From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], Intro 4)
	A reaction: I love it when philososphers make simple and illuminating remarks like this. You could read 500 pages of technical verbiage about plural reference without grasping that this is the underlying issue. Sounds right to me.