display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
2 ideas
12876 | Philosophy is stuck on the Fregean view that an individual is anything with a proper name [Simons] |
Full Idea: Modern philosophy is still under the spell of Frege's view that an individual is anything that has a proper name. (Note: But not only are empty names now recognised, but some are aware of the existence of plural reference). | |
From: Peter Simons (Parts [1987], 8.1) | |
A reaction: Presumably every electron in the universe is an individual, and every (finite) number which has never been named has a pretty clear identity. Presumably Pegasus, John Doe, and 'the person in the kitchen' have to be accommodated. |
11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
Full Idea: λ-abstraction can be used to abstract and disambiguate a predicate. De re is [λx◊P(x)](f) - f has the possible-P property - and de dicto is ◊[λxP(x)](f) - possibly f has the P-property. Also applies to □. | |
From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], §3.3) | |
A reaction: Compare the Barcan formula. Originated with Church in the 1930s, and Carnap 1947, but revived by Stalnaker and Thomason 1968. Because it refers to the predicate, it has a role in intensional versions of logic, especially modal logic. |